The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with
Federal Court Intervention
Mathew D. Staver
The Abstention Doctrines required federal courts to step aside
in order to allow the state adjudicatory process to take its course.
The purpose of these doctrines is to preserve the balance between
state and federal sovereignty. Sometimes this constitutional balance
is referred to as federalism or comity. Certainly state courts should
be free to perform their adjudicatory functions without being monitored or interrupted by federal courts. There are, however, circumstances when federal court intervention is necessary to protect basic
civil liberties guaranteed under the United States Constitution.1
The federal plaintiff must be familiar with abstention issues or
run the risk of protracted federal court litigation, which may eventually be halted when abstention is raised. This Article will review various aspects of the Abstention Doctrines, including the Anti= 3 Younger, Rooker-Feld
Injunction Act 2 and the Pullman,
man,5 Brillhart6
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For a brief comparison of abstention doctrines, see CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT LKr
AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 4241 (1988). For an argument toward re-

orienting the abstention doctrines, see James C.Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously:
How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine,46 STAN. L. REv. 1049 (1994). For an analysis of Burford abstention applied to RICO, see Tracy Doherty et al., Survey of White
Collar Crime: RICO, 31 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 769 (1994). Finally, for an examination of
the conflict between ColoradoRiver abstention and legislative enactments, see David
J. McCarty, Preclusion Concerns as an Additional Factor When Staying a Federal Suit in
Deference to a ConcurrentState Proceeding,53 FoRDHA L. REv. 1183 (1985).
2 For a discussion of the Anti-Injunction Act, see
infra Part I.
3 For a discussion of the PullmanAbstention Doctrine, see infraPart II.
4 For a discussion of the Younger Abstention Doctrine, see
infraPart I.

1102

ABSTENTION DOCTRiNE

1103

and Colorado River' Abstention Doctrines. After discussing the various
Abstention Doctrines, this article will then apply these doctrines to the
case of Cheffer v. McGregor" The plaintiff in Cheffer filed a complaint in
federal court seeking an injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state
court injunction. This classic federal-state conflict lies at the heart of the
Abstention Doctrines.
I.

THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT

The Ant-Injunction Act (the Act) was first codified in 1793.
The Act provides as follows:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to state
proceedings in the state court except as expressly authorized by
an act of Congress or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate itsjudgments.'0

For a discussion of the Rooker-FeldmanAbstention Doctrine, see infta Part IV.
6 For a discussion of the BrillhartAbstention Doctrine, see infraPart V.
For a discussion of the ColoradoRiver Abstention Doctrine, see infra Part VI.
a 6F.3d 705 (llthCir. 1993).
Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22 § 5, 1 Stat. 335 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1988)). The Anti-Injunction Act of 1793 provided in part that a "writ of injunction [shall not] be granted [by any federal court] to stay proceedings in any
court of a state," thus establishing a general prohibition against federal intervention. Id.
10 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Passed by Congress in 1793, the precise origins of the Act
are shrouded in obscurity, but the basic purpose was to prevent "'needless friction
between state and federal courts.'" Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1972)
(quoting Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9
(1940)). The law remained unchanged until amended in 1874 to permit federal
courts to stay state court proceedings that interfered with the administration of federal bankruptcy proceedings. The present wording was adopted in 1948. The Supreme Court then recognized additional exceptions to the Act under at least six
other federal laws: (1) legislation providing for removal of litigation from state to
federal courts under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1450; (2) legislation limiting the liability of
shipowners under 46 U.S.C. § 185; (3) legislation providing for federal interpleader
actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2361; (4) legislation conferring federal jurisdiction over
farm mortgages under 11 U.S.C. § 203; (5) legislation governing federal habeas
corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2251; and (6) legislation providing for control of prices under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 205(a), 56 Stat
§ 205(a), which expired in 1947. See Mitkhum, 407 U.S. at 234-235. In addition to
the above exceptions, Congress recognized other exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
Act. One such exception is the "in rem" exception where a federal court is permitted to enjoin a state court proceeding in order to protect its jurisdiction of a res
over which it first obtained jurisdiction. See id. at 235. A second is the "relitigation"
exception permitting a federal court to enjoin relitigation in a state court of issues
already decided in federal court. See id. A third exception permits a federal injunction against a state court proceeding when the plaintiff in the federal court is the
United States itself or a federal agency asserting *superior federal interests." Id. at
235-36.
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In Mitchum v. Foster," the United States Supreme Court held
that actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are specifically excepted
from the Anti-Injunction Act, and therefore the statute does not ban
2
federal courts from enjoining enforcement of a state court order.
The Mitchum Court noted that Congress envisioned § 1983
would alter the relationship between the state and federal governments:
[The] legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and
the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created
rights; it was concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that state officers might, in fact, be
antipathetic to the vindication off those rights; and it believed
that these fWilings extended to the state courts.
Section 1983 was thus a product of a vast transformation
from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late
18th century when the anti-injunction statute was enacted. The
very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights--to protect the people from unconstitutional action
under color of state law, "whether that action be executive, legislative, orjudicial." In carrying out that purpose, Congress plainly
authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in § 1983 ac407 U.S. 225 (1972). In Mitchum, a state court proceeding was brought to
close the defendant's bookstore under a state public nuisance law. See id. at 227.

The state court entered a preliminary injunction closing the bookstore. See id. The
defendant then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida, alleging a violation of his First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. See id. The federal plaintiff requested injunctive and declaratory relief against the state court proceedings on the ground that the state law was
unconstitutional. See id. A three-judge district court refused to enjoin the state
court proceeding because it found that federal injunctive relief was barred by the
Anti-Injunction Act. See id. at 227-28. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that suits brought under § 1983 are not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.
See id. at 228.
12 In reversing the district court by finding that actions brought
under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 were excepted from the Anti-Injunction Act, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]f 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not within the "expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute, then a federal equity court is wholly
without power to grant any relief in a § 1983 suit seeking to stay a state
court proceeding. In short, if a § 1983 action is not an "expressly
authorized" statutory exception, the anti-injunction law absolutely
prohibits in such an action all federal equitable intervention in a
pending state court proceeding, whether civil or criminal, and regardless of how extraordinary the particular circumstances may be.
Id. at 229. The Court found that without a § 1983 exception, the federal judiciary
would be impermissibly limited. See id. at 242-43.
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tions, by expressly authorizing a "suit in equity" as one of the
means of redress. And this Court long ago recognized that federal injunctive relief against a state court proceeding can in some
circumstances be essential to prevent great, immediate and irreparable loss of a person's constitutional rights. For these reasons, we conclude that, under the criteria established in our previous decisions construing the Anti-Injunction statute, § 1983 is
an Act of Congress that falls within the "expressly authorized" exception of that law. '

The Mitchum decision, however, addressed only the applicability
of the Anti-Injunction Act, not the Younger Abstention Doctrine.4
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar a federal court injunction against enforcement of a state court order.' In Machesky v.
Bizzell, the federal court was faced with a suit against a state court
judge who enjoined civil rights protesters from demonstrating within
three hundred feet of certain businesses.'" Finding that the AntiInjunction Act did not apply, the court barred enforcement of the
state court injunction and noted: "Where the interests in comity col-

is Id. at 242-43 (citations omitted).
14 In discussing the Younger decision, Mitchum pointed out that during the previous term the Court had "eschewed any reliance on the [Anti-Injunction] statute in
reversing the judgment, basing [the Younger] decision instead upon. . . 'Our Federalism.'" Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 230. Later in Mitehum, the Court again insisted that
its decision was in no way meant to "qualify . . . the principles of equity, comity,
and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court
proceeding." Id. at 243. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Blackmun, stressed in his concurring opinion that the Mitchum decision "does nothing to
'question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism.'" Id.
at 244 (Burger, J., concurring). Burger suggested that on remand the lower court,
"before reaching a decision on the merits of [the] appellant's claim, should properly consider whether general notions of equity or principles of federalism, similar
to those invoked in Younger, prevent the issuance of an injunction against the state."
Id. Professor Stravitz argues that the Court specifically created the Younger Abstention Doctrine in anticipation of the Court's holding in Mitchum, because without
Younger a complete exception to the Anti-Injunction Act would result in unrestrained federal court intervention in state court proceedings. See Howard B.
Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 57
FoaImH L. Rrv. 997, 1027-28 (1989). However, the Mitchum Court cited Camermn
v.Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), Douglas v.
City offeannette, 312 U.S. 157 (1943), Wiliams v. Miller, 317 U.S. 599 (1942), Watson
v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri PacificRailroad Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941);
Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935), and Fennerv. Boykin, 271 U.S.

240 (1926), to support the proposition that the Younger Abstention Doctrine's
foundation was laid many years prior to 1971.
1 SeeMacheskyv. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
18 See id. at 290.
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lide with the paramount institutional interests protected by the First
Amendment, comity must yield."17
In Munoz v. County of Imperial,"' a California state court enjoined
the selling of water for use outside the county. Munoz was not a
party to the underlying state court action."' In granting the request
for federal injunctive relief under § 1983 enjoining enforcement of
the state court order, the federal court acknowledged that Munoz
was not a party to the state court action and could do nothing to appeal or otherwise influence the result of the state court proceeding.
"There [were] no means by which [Munoz could] challenge the
[state court injunction];" so therefore, federal
injunctive relief was
21
Act.
Anti-Injunction
the
by
not precluded

II. THE PULLMANABSTENTION DOCTRINE
Although the Abstention Doctrine has its roots in English and
early American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court first acknowledged the doctrine 2in
the 19412 decision of Railroad Commission of
3
Texas v. Pullman Co..
A.

Backgroundof the Pullman Abstention Doctrine

In Chisholm v. Georgia,2" the Supreme Court ruled that a state
may be sued by its citizens. The Court's opinion sparked an immediate backlash. Some argued that the states might face bankruptcy if
they could be sued for damages. In response to the "startling and
unexpected"25 decision announced in Chisholm, Congress proposed
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution as follows: "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be con17 Id.

is 510 F. Supp. 879, 880 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
19 See id. at 881.
20 See id. at 881-82. In reviewing whether to grant injunctive relief based
on a
violation of § 1983, the court must determine that the act sought to be enjoined involves state action. A state court injunction constitutes state action. See, e.g., New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Gresham Park Community v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981); Henry v. First
Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979).
See Munoz, 510 F. Supp. at 881-82.
Se Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
23312 U.S. 496 (1941).
24

2 U.S. 419, 479 (1793).

" Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890). Justice Bradley used this language

to describe the political and intellectual responses to the Chisholm decision should
the Constitution be interpreted to forbid suits against states by citizens of other
states but not citizens of the same state.
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strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 2
The Supreme Court interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to
forbid all individual suits brought in federal court against any state
regardless of citizenship.2 For approximately a century, a wronged
plaintiff could not initiate a federal suit against a state.
The 1908 Ex parte Young 8 decision dramatically changed the judicial landscape by allowing federal litigants to sue states for alleged
constitutional violations. The Supreme Court pierced the previously
impervious shield of state sovereign immunity by creating an exception to the Eleventh Amendment." The Court held that, while a
state could not be sued by one of its citizens, an officer of the state
acting in an unconstitutional manner could be sued by one of its
citizens." Consequently, states could be sued, even without their
consent, merely by naming the official who engaged in unconstitutional behavior.
Congress sought to ameliorate the effects of Ex parte Young by
restricting preliminary injunctions and by requiring that petitions for
particular types of preliminary injunctive relief against state officials
be heard by a three-judge district court. The decisions of the three26

u.S. CONST. amend. XI. For a modem historical examination of the Eleventh

Amendment, see William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretation of the 11th Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction, 85 STAN. L. REv.
1033, 1058-62 (1983).
See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1.
28 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
In Exparte Young, shareholders of a railroad company
challenged in federal court Minnesota legislation that fixed railroad rates, alleging
the legislation was confiscatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
at 127-30. The Court issued a preliminary injunction that, among other things,
prohibited the Attorney General of Minnesota, Edward Young, from enforcing the
legislation. See id. at 132. Young nonetheless attempted to force compliance with
the new rate, and the Court held him in contempt. See id. at 133-34.
" The Court's creation of the exception presents an amusing example of ajudicially created legal fiction. For a discussion of incorrectly applied Federalist principles and a neo-modem look at the Eleventh Amendment, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalisra,96 YAi L.J. 1425, 1481-84 (1987).
30 SeeExparte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60. Specifically,
the Court said:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional; and if it be
so, the use of the name of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act
to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of,
and one which does not affect, the state in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting, by the use of the name of the state, to enforce a
legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional.
I& at 159.
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judge panel were directly appealable for review to the United States
Supreme Court."
B. Pullman Abstention: The Case
In 1941, the Supreme Court limited Ex parte Young when it
handed down Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company.' The
facts of Pullman involved a Texas Railroad Commission
(Commission) order regarding who could be in charge of train cars
for sleeping passengers. In Texas, the majority of trains pulled more
than one sleeping car under the charge of Caucasian conductors."
In some areas of Texas where train traffic was less busy, however,
trains only included one car for sleeping passengers. These single
sleeping cars were generally under the charge of African-American
porters.
The Commission ordered all sleeping cars be placed under the
charge of conductors, not porters, and the Pullman Company, along
with other railroad companies, brought suit in federal court.-" The
Commission's order was assailed as a violation of Texas law and the
United States Constitution, specifically, the Equal Protection, Due
Process, and Interstate Commerce Clauses.3 A three-judge panel
prohibited enforcement of the order.37 The federal court found that
the Commission lacked authority to promulgate the order.- The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, finding that the
three-judge panel should have abstained from reaching the merits of
the case. 9

s1On August 12, 1976, the three-judge panel requirement was abolished. See
Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982)).
" 312 U.S. 496, 496 (1941). For a thorough analysis of the PullmanAbstention
Doctrine, see Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman AbstentionDoctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974).
3
SeePu//an,312 U.S. at 497.
34 See id. The Court noted that "[a]s is well
known, porters on Pullmans are colored and conductors are white." Id,
See id. at 497-98. The order read in pertinent part: "'[N]o sleeping car
shall
be operated on any line of railroad in the State of Texas. . .unless such cars are
continuously in the charge of an employee. . . having the rank and position of
Pullman conductor.'" Id.
36 See id.
at 498.
37 See
id.
W See id. at 499. The Texas Railroad Commission found power to promulgate
the order under Texas Civil Code Annotated § 6445, which granted the authority
"to prevent any and all. . . abuses" in conducting the business of the railroad. Id.
at 498 n. 1.
SSee Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501-02.
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1. Analyzing the PullmanHolding
In Pullman, the Supreme Court reiterated the general rule that

federal courts ought to avoid reaching a constitutional question if
the case can properly be resolved by addressing the issue of state

law.4 0 The Court not only avoided reaching the constitutional question, it even abstained from deciding the case based on state law.

According to the Court, because the Texas law was "far from clear,"
the Texas Supreme Court, and not the federal courts, should first be

afforded the opportunity to interpret state law.4'1 The Court reasoned that federal courts risked interpreting state law inaccurately
when the law is ambiguous and the state courts have not interpreted
its meaning.4 An inaccurate interpretation by federal courts could
later be contradicted by the state courts, thus wasting judicial re-

sources and possibly requiring subsequent federal intervention.'
Therefore, when confronted with an ambiguous state law" that has

not been interpreted by the state courts, the federal courts should
"exercise their wise discretion by staying their hands,"' meanwhile
40

See id. at 498; see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347

(1936) (refusing to reach the constitutional question in instance where other
grounds were present through which the Court could settle the controversy); Siler
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (stressing the proper course
is to avoid reaching the constitutional question if possible unless "important reasons" support a deviation).
41 Se Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499. Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter
commented: "Reading the Texas statutes and the Texas decisions as outsiders
without special competence in Texas law, we would have little confidence in our independentjudgment regarding the application of that law to the present situation."
Id. Had the state law been unambiguous, the Supreme Court likely would have decided the case on state law. The Pullman doctrine is usually invoked when the state
law in question is ambiguous and the state courts have not had the opportunity to
interpret the law.
See id. The Court stated that a federal court's decision on an ambiguous state
law that has not yet been interpreted by the state courts would be merely "a forecast" instead of an accurate determination of the law. See id.
43 See id. at 500. A "tentative answer" to the state law question could be
"displaced tomorrow by a state" court's decision, resulting in a waste of the
'resources of equity." Id.
The use of the term "ambiguous" should not be confused with "vague." A
federal court may invalidate a state law because it is vague or overbroad. If, however, a state law is susceptible to more than one interpretation with one interpretation rendering it unconstitutional and another rendering it constitutional, then the
federal courts should consider abstaining until the state courts have the opportunity
to interpret its meaning. However, if it appears the state courts either had the opportunity to interpret its meaning or would probably refrain from interpreting the
law, the federal court should not abstain.
45 Pu/lman, 312 U.S. at 501. With shades of Justice Black's later soliloquy
on
"Our Federalism" in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),Justice Frankfurter paid
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retaining jurisdiction to rehear the constitutional issue should the
need arise."
The Pullman Abstention Doctrine does not apply when the state
law is clear and unambiguous, when every application of the state law
is unconstitutional, or when the state courts have had the opportunity to interpret the state law but have not done so. The principle
behind Pullman rests upon the rule of statutory construction that a
state or federal statute is presumed constitutional. When a state
statute is ambiguous to the point that one interpretation of its application would be unconstitutional while another interpretation would
yield the opposite result, then federal courts should allow state
courts the first opportunity to interpret the law.
2.

Expansion of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine

In 1957, the Supreme Court, in Government & Civic Employees Organization Committee v. S.F. Windsor," partially clarified whether state
or federal courts should address a constitutional challenge to state
law. Windsor involved a federal suit to enjoin the enforcement of an
Alabama state statute that denied employment benefits to public
employees who joined labor unions. 9 The United States Supreme
homage to the necessity of giving due regard to the independence of the state and
federal systems whereby state governments should be afforded the opportunity to
order their affairs without federal intervention. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500-01.
That the two discourses are similar in rationale is further underscored by Justice
O'Connor's discussion of "comity and federalism" concerns in weighing whether
federal courts should abstain based on Pullman. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 508 (1985) (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501-02. Although Justice Frankfurter did not direct
the lower court to retain jurisdiction for that specific purpose, the evolution of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine dictates that federal courts do so. See, e.g., Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
47 The Court has been inconsistent when deciding
whether Pullman is appropriate or whether the state law is unclear. Compare Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (finding Pullman abstention to be inappropriate by the Ninth Circuit because the statute was not unclear but the Supreme
Court failed to address it in deciding the case) with Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S.
167 (1959) (ruling that Pullman should be applied because the state did have the
opportunity to construe the state statute, despite a lower court's finding that the
statute was unconstitutional). For a discussion of the inadequacies of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, see MarthaA. Field, TheAbstentionDoctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L.
REv. 590 (1977) (arguing the doctrine is not worth the costs inflicted upon litigants).
353 U.S. 364 (1957) (per curiam).
49 Se id. at 365 The plaintiffs alleged that Alabama Code § 720 (1953)
abridged
their freedoms of speech and association in addition to violating the Due Process,
Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth

1998]

ABSTENTION DOCTPJNE

1111

Court ultimately abstained from reaching the constitutional question.' The Court reasoned that the Alabama Supreme Court "might

have construed the statute in a different manner" if the court had
been presented with the constitutional claim."' That the Alabama
court did not have the opportunity to construe the statute in light of
the constitutional claim meant that any decision by a federal court
would result in an insufficient bona fide interpretation of Alabama
state law.52
The Windsor decision caused confusion that remained unsettled
until 1964 when the Supreme Court handed down England v. Louisiana State Board of MedicalExaminers. ' The England Court settled what
procedures should be followed if a federal plaintiff desired to preserve the right to a choice of forum.-" The Court held that a federal
plaintiff remanded to a state court proceeding is not forced to litigate the constitutional question in state court. The federal plaintiff
is only required to "inform [the state court] what [the] federal
claims are, so that the state statute may be construed 'in light of'
those claims. " " Compliance with England is accomplished by the
Amendment See id.
50 The case was batted up and down in both the federal and state court systems
before the Supreme Court's final adjudication. First, a three-judge panel abstained
from reaching the constitutional question. The Supreme Court affirmed the abstention. The plaintiffs then commenced an action in the Alabama state courts,
eventually reaching the Alabama Supreme Court. See Windsor, 353 U.S. at 365.
Next, the plaintiffs resubmitted the case to the three-judge panel, but the panel
dismissed the case finding the issue was resolved by the Alabama courts. The plaintiffs again sought review by the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 366. The
facts of this case provide the greatest fodder for criticism of the PullmanAbstention
Doctrine. The plaintiffs, exhausted by two fruitless trips to the United States Supreme Court, abandoned their claim after they were directed to pursue their claim
a second time in the Alabama state courts. See Field, supra note 32, at 1086 n.65.
51 Windsor, 353 U.S. at 366.
5See id.
375 U.S. 411 (1960). The Court's decision in Windsor appeared to remove
from the federal litigant the right to a choice of forum. As noted later, the England
Court clarified this matter and preserved the litigant's right to choose a forum.
54 Englands facts involved a group of chiropractors
who filed suit to enjoin enforcement of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act as applied to them, alleging the
Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 412. A three-judge panel abstained under Pullman. A state action then commenced resulting in a ruling against
the chiropractors. See id. at 413-14. The plaintiffs then returned to the three-judge
panel for resubmission of their constitutional issues, but the district court dismissed
the action, finding that the case had been resolved by the Louisiana court system.
See id. at 414. The district court, however, viewed the case as illustrative of the predicament in which a federal plaintiff can become caught in the web of the Windsor
decision. See id. at 414-15; see also England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 194 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D. La. 1961), rev'd and remanded, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
England, 375 U.S. at 420. The Court, however, generously exempted the Eng-
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federal plaintiff clearly stating for the record that although the constitutional claims are exposed in the state court proceedings, they
are exposed solely for the purpose of resolving the statute in light of
the constitutional issues, not to litigate the constitutional issues in
state court because the plaintiff intends to return to federal court."
The federal litigant's right to a choice of forum was therefore pre5
served by the Court's decision in England.
III. THE YOUNGER ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

In addition to the PullmanAbstention Doctrine, the federal litigant must also consider the Abstention Doctrine that was unveiled by
the Court in Younger v. Harris." The Younger Abstention Doctrine is
based upon the long tradition of federalism and comity that grew
out of English and early American jurisprudence.
A.

Background of theYounger Abstention Doctrine

The Abstention Doctrine has its roots in English jurisprudence
where courts of equity were prohibited from interfering with criminal proceedings. As early as 1888, in In re Sawyer,6 the United States
Supreme Court refused to intervene in a prospective criminal proceeding.I The Sawyer Court discussed historical English rules for

land plaintiffs from this requirement because the Court found that their confusion
regarding the Windsor decision prompted them to submit their constitutional claims
to the state court and that their confusion wasjustifiable. See id. at 422.
5
See id. at 421.
1 See id. However, a federal litigant is not prohibited from litigating the constitutional claims in state court. The Court took strides to stress that, if the litigant
"freely and without reservation" submits the constitutional issues to the state court
for the state court's decision, the litigant may do so. The litigant will be bound by
the state court decision and cannot avoid a contrary decision by relitigating the issues in federal court. See id. at 419.
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
See, e.g., George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide-Rethinking Younger Abstention, 59 CEo. WASH. L. Rzv. 114 (1990); AnthonyJ.
Dennis, The Illegitimate Foundations of the Younger Abstention Doctrine, 10 U.
BRIGEPoRT L. REv. 311 (1990); David Logan, JudicialFederalism in the Court of History, 66 OR. L. Rzv. 453 (1988); Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and
the Limits of theJudicialFunction, 94YAu LJ. 71 (1984);James C. Rehnquist, Taking
Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1049
(1994); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rgv. 543 (1985);
Donald H. Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce ConstitutionalSafeguardsin the State CiminalProcess, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 266 (1976).
124 U.S. 200 (1888).
61 See id. at 209-10, 219-20.
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courts of equity and cited the Anti-Injunction Act as a basis for declining to intervene. 63
In 1908, however, the Supreme Court decided Ex parte Young"
and rejected the argument that federal courts lacked the jurisdiction
to enjoin prospective state criminal proceedings. Creating a slightly
more permissive intervention standard," the Court declared the contested state statute unconstitutional.
In 1926, the Court again tightened the abstention standard with
its holding in Fennerv. Boykin." In discussing Ex parte Young, the Fenner Court noted that while federal courts may enjoin state proceedings they may do so only under "extraordinary circumstances where
the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate."6 7
Hence, the FennerCourt added a definitive prong upon which later
analysis would turn in measuring irreparable harm."
The Court, in 1943, laid another brick in the foundation of the
Younger Abstention Doctrine. In Douglas v. City of Jeannette, the
Court declined to intervene in a state court proceeding, despite that
the Court could have decided the case without reaching the Abstention Doctrine.70 Instead, the Court held that the federal plaintiffs
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
See Sawyer, 124 U.S. at 220.
" 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
62

65 The Court held that "officers of the state. . . who threaten and are
about to
commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the . . . Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action." Id, at 155-56. Although the
opinion attempted to reconcile the glaring disparity between In re Sawyer and Ex
parte Young, the Court did so ineffectively, relegating the discussion of In re Sawyer to
two anemic sentences. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 162. The two cases can only
be reconciled if Exparte Young is viewed as ajudicial relaxation of Sawyer's firm principle of nonintervention.
6
271 U.S. 240 (1926).
67 Id. at 243. The Court stated that the criminal
defendant must "first set up and
rely upon his defense in the state courts" before resorting to federal court. Id. at
244. Ex parte Young held that assertion of constitutional defenses in the state proceeding was not an adequate remedy at law. See 209 U.S. at 164-65.
69 Younger quotes Fenner, noting that the "'irreparable
injury'" must be "'both
great and immediate.'" Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (quoting Fenner,
271 U.S. at 243). Fennerlanguished in ignominy before the Younger Court gave the
four-page, 1926 Fennercase a role in jurisprudential history. Until the Younger decision, the Court's earlier opinion in Ex partk Young dominated abstention jurisprudence.
69 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
70 The state action in question involved the enforcement of Municipal Ordinance Number 60, which prohibited the distribution of wares, merchandise, or
other articles without first obtaining a license. See Dougas, 319 U.S. at 159. The
plaintiffs were Jehovah's Witnesses who had previously been prosecuted and were
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had not suffered irreparable injury because they could assert their
constitutional defense in the state court proceeding. "' The Court
found that intervention was unnecessary and inappropriate."
5 marked a relaxed
The 1965 decision of Dombrowski v. PfisteW
era
in the evolution of Abstention Doctrine. Addressing the AntiInjunction Act,74 the Court noted that the Act only bars suits involving cases already pending in state courts, but not injunctions against
the commencement of state court proceedings. " Dombrowski found
that in cases involving First Amendment allegations of overbreadth
abstention is not proper." Dombrowski appeared to signal a new direction for federal court litigants facing the Abstention Doctrine.

then threatened with additional prosecution under the ordinance for distributing
religious literature. The Court handed down Murdock v. Pennsylvania,319 U.S. 105
(1943), on the same day as Douglas. Both cases involved the exact same ordinance
and some of the same plaintiffs. In Murdock, the Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional as applied. See id. at 115. However, although the Court in Douglas
mentioned the Murdock holding, the Court did not decide the Douglas case based
on the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. See Douglas, 319 U.S. at 159. Rather,
the Court chose to abstain. See id at 163. In Dougas, the Supreme Court upheld
the district court's refusal to enjoin application of a city ordinance to religious solicitation, even though on the same day the Supreme Court in Murdock found the
statute unconstitutional as applied to a criminal conviction. The Supreme Court
reasoned that since injunctive relief looks to the future, and it was not alleged that
the state courts and prosecutors would fail to enforce the Murdock ruling, the Court
found nothing tojustify an injunction. SeeDouglas, 319 U.S. at 165.
71 319 U.S. at 163.
7
See id. at 165-66.
73 380 U.S. 479
(1965).
74 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1988).
5 SeeDombrowski, 380 U.S. at 484 n.2. Many of the previous
Supreme Court decisions either failed to specifically discuss the Anti-Injunction Act or did so only in
general terms. Although at the time of In re Samyer the only exception to the AntiInjunction Act was a case "authorized by a bankrupt act," later amendments to the
Anti-Injunction Act made provision for three exceptions to the general rule against
federal court intervention: (1) express authorization by Act of Congress, (2) necessary aid of a federal court's jurisdiction, or (3) necessary aid in protecting or effectuating a federal court'sjudgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
,8 See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 486. In Douglas, the Supreme Court found abstention was appropriate in part because of an assumption that defense of a criminal
prosecution would generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights. See
319 U.S. at 157. However, in the case of an overly broad statute that chills free expression, this assumption is not warranted. According to Dombrovuki, the threat of
sanctions may deter free speech, and therefore in the context of First Amendment
freedoms, the Supreme Court has "not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their rights. For free expression-of transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exercising their rights--might
be the loser." Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 486.
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B. Younger Abstention: The Case
1. Analyzing the YoungerHolding
The Supreme Court's decision in Younger v. Hami 7 tightened
the Dombrowski standard and clarified the Court's analysis. The fed1 8 in Younger requested and received injunctive relief 9
eral plaintiff
from a three-judge district court panelso that enjoined the district attorney 1 from prosecuting Harris under an unconstitutional statute.'
Writing for the majority, Justice Black reversed the lower court's
decision based on sensitivity with respect to equity," comity" and
401 U.S. 37 (1971).

The Court decided five companion cases on the same
day. In Boyle v. Landiy, 401 U.S. 77, 80 (1971), the Court reversed the lower court
decision, citing a lack of irreparable injury to plaintiffs. The Court in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 88 (1971), reversed the lower court's suppression order, based
in part on Younger's principles. In Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971), the
Court held the same policies articulated in Younger regarding injunctive relief
should be utilized in determining whether to issue declaratory relief. Both Dyson v.
Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971), and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971), were per curiam reversals based on abstention rationale.
78 AlthoughJohn Harris was the party indicted and the original
federal plaintiff,
Jim Dan, Diane Hirsch, and Farrell Broslawsky intervened in the suit, claiming that
Harris' prosecution would cause them to "suffer immediate and irreparable injury."
Younger, 401 U.S. at 39-40. The Court, however, held the intervenors lacked a genuine controversy and therefore had no standing to join the action. See id. at 42.
The federal plaintiff also requested that the district court "grant 'such other
and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper'" that, in a footnote, the
Supreme Court stated was an improper request for declaratory relief. Id. at 41 n.2.
Before 1976, constitutional challenges to state laws required the assembly of a
special panel of three judges. On August 12, 1976, the three-judge panel requirement was abolished. See Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. § 1119 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2284 (1982)).
"I Eve~leJ. Younger was the state district attorney from Los Angeles County. See
Younger, 401 U.S. at 39.
See id. at 40. The statute in question was the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 11400-11401 (West 1982). In Whitney v. California,274 U.S.
357, 372 (1927), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the California
Criminal Syndicalism Act, but later specifically overruled the Whitney Court's decision in Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (per curiam), by holding a
similar statute, the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act, repugnant to the Federal Constitution.
a3 Long-standing equitable principles of English jurisprudence, dating
as far
back as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, dictate that courts of equity should
not interfere with criminal proceedings. See Ralph U. Whitten, Federal Declaratoy
and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits
ofJudicial Discretion, 53 N.C. L. Rzv. 591, 606 (1975). Equitable intervention requires the court to consider (1) whether the party in the criminal proceeding has
an adequate remedy at common law and (2) whether the party will suffer irreparable injury if the court denies equitable relief and refuses to interfere with the criminal proceeding. See id. at 600-04. As Justice Black's citation to the theory of equita-
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federalism." The general rule provides that federal courts should
not interfere with pending, ongoing state criminal proceedings except under "special circumstances. " 86 Special circumstances include
prosecutorial bad faith" or blatant and flagrant unconstitutional
construction." The Court, however, expressed no opinion "about
the circumstances under which federal courts may act when there is
no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun.""

blejurisprudence denotes, these two pillars of equity jurisprudence are still utilized
by American courts deciding whether to exercise equitable powers. See Younger, 401
U.S. at 43-44.
" Comity encompasses the notion that, based on judicial courtesy and deference, the courts of one jurisdiction will give credit and effect to the laws and judicial
holdings of courts from another jurisdiction. See Charles Warren, Federal and State
CourtInterference, 43 HARv. L. REv. 345, 349 (1930).
85 The Court entwines the concepts of comity and federalism
so tightly that it is
virtually impossible to discern where one concept begins and the other ends. See
Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. Justice Black terms "Our Federalism" as the "recognition of
the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best
if the states and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in
their separate ways." Id. at 44. Justice Black's eloquent description of our federalist
form of government has ignited heated debate among legal scholars regarding the
proper amount of deference for states' rights shown by the Court via utilization of
abstention doctrines. See Stravitz, supra note 14, at 1005-06, 1022-33; Zeigler, supra
note 59, at 283-306. But see Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civik The Consequences of FederalDeference to State Court Proceedings: A Response to Professor Stravit, 58
FoRDHAm L. REv. 173 (1989). Cf Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1485 (1987) (arguing that only states
that fail to follow the federal design of the law should face federal court intervention).
See Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. The Court later states that the "normal thing to
do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is
not to issue such injunctions." Id. at 45. This appears to contradict the Court's
practice prior to the Younger decision when the Warren Court permitted intervention in state court criminal prosecutions. Cf Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the
Burger Court, and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031
(1983) (comparing the two ChiefJustices' legacies for willingness to intervene and
stray into activist territory). In a footnote, the Younger Court discussed its holding in
Samuels v. Mackel, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), noting that declaratory relief is also improper when a prosecution involving a challenge to a state statute is pending in
state court at the time the federal suit is initiated. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 41 n.2.
See Younger, 401 U.S. at 49-50, 56. Prosecutorial exception is akin to a glass
house, devoid of protection. See C. Keith Wingate, The Bad Faith HarassmentExcept/on to theYounger Doctrine: Exploring the Empty Universe, 5 REV. LrrIG. 123 (1986).
N See Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402
(1941)).
a Id. at 41. The lack of ongoing state proceedings involving the federal plaintiff
is a major exception to the YoungerAbstention Doctrine.
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The Court held that, although Harris had an actual controversy* with the state because he was facing prosecution, the other
three plaintiff-intervenors did not have an actual controversy and
lacked standing." Intervenors Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky merely
alleged they felt inhibited from exercising their constitutional
rights.' The Court found their vague, speculative inhibitions insufficient to grant standing. 5 The Court hypothesized that an actual
controversy might exist for the three plaintiff-intervenors had they
alleged a threat of prosecution, the likelihood of prosecution, or a
remote possibility of prosecution," but mere speculation of prosecution is insufficient to provide a basis for suit.5 Thus, only Harris had
standing."
The Court's core holding is that, absent special circumstances, a
criminal defendant may not enjoin a pending, ongoing, state prosecution by filing an action in federal court. Key to the Court's deciThe Court first defined "case or controversy" in Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346, 356-57 (1911) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); In re Pacific
R.R., 32 F. 241 (1887)), in discussing the requirement that the exercise ofjudicial
power is limited by the Constitution to "cases" and "controversies."
91 See Younge 401 U.S. at 41-42.
92 See id. at 42. Intervenors Dan and Hirsch alleged they felt inhibited to advo90

cate the replacement of capitalism with socialism while intervenor Broslawsky felt
uncertain whether he could, as part of his class studies, teach Karl Marx's doctrines
or read from the Communist Manifesto. See id, at 39-40.
9See
id. at 41-42. Emanating from the case or controversy requirement is the

requirement that the federal plaintiff have "standing" to bring the lawsuit. The
federal plaintiff must show both a palpable injury and a traceable connection between the injury and the conduct of the offender. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 559-64 (1992); Gollustv. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 126 (1991); International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S.
72, 77-78 (1991).

If the three plaintiff-intervenors alleged a threat of prosecution, the Court
probably would not have abstained from deciding their claims. Federal injunctive
relief would be proper for these three plaintiff-intervenors because they, unlike
Harris, were not parties to any ongoing state criminal proceedings.

95 Here Younger cited Golden v. ZwAckl, 394 U.S. 103, 110 (1969), where the
Court found the plaintiff's controversy to be purely conjectural in nature and without a basis in reality. The dispute was previously argued in Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241 (1967), where the Court ruled that the lower court erred in abstaining
from deciding the federal plaintiffs constitutional claim regarding the distribution
of anonymous campaign literature. See id. at 254. In Golden, the federal plaintiff
was a former candidate for the House of Representatives who had since been appointed to the New York State Supreme Court. According to the Court, he would
not, in all likelihood, ever again be a candidate for the House of Representatives
and would probably never again face that threat to his constitutional rights. See
Golden, 394 U.S. at 109.
See Younger, 401 U.S. at 41-42.
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sion was that the federal plaintiff was then the subject of a pending
state prosecution." Harris was indicted in a California state court
prior to filing his federal complaint." Because Harris would have the
opportunity to raise his constitutional defenses in the state court
proceeding," the Court held he was not in danger of suffering irreparable injury.'" To enjoin the pending state prosecution would
be to crack the doctrinal foundation described by the Court as "Our
Federalism."'' Abstention was necessary to preserve the separate
functions of the state and federal governments.

The Younger Court specifically refused to express any "view
about the circumstances under which federal courts may act when
there is no prosecutionpending in state courts at the time the federalproceeding is begun."'"2 In a concurring opinion, ' Justice Stewart emphasized that Younger dealt "only with the proper policy to be followed
by a federal court when asked to intervene.., in a criminalprosecution which is contemporaneously pending in a state court."' Justice
Stewart further noted that Younger did not "resolve the problems involved when a federal court is asked to give injunctive... relief from
future state criminal prosecutions"' °" because Younger clearly confined
"itself to deciding the policy considerations that.., must prevail
when federal courts are asked to interfere with pending state prosecutions."'"
See id. at 39-40.
98 See id.

See id. at 49-50. The Court distinguished Harris's opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in the state proceeding from the opportunities afforded to the
federal plaintiff in Dombrowsi See id. at 50-51. In Dombrowski, the threatened
prosecution was employed to harass the defendants. See id. Thus, there was no assurance that raising the constitutional claims in the state proceedings would have
resulted in the vindication of those rights. See id.
100 See id. at 49. The Court stated that even irreparable injury is "insufficient unless it is 'both great and immediate.'" Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (quoting Fenner v.
Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926)). In his concurring opinion that Justice Harlan joined, Justice Stewart defined a threat that is great and immediate to include
.official lawlessness" of the sort that amounts to bad faith prosecution or official
harassment. See id. at 56 (StewartJ, concurring).
101For an analysis of whether the federalist defense ofjudicial review can be sustained under modem scrutiny, see Mark Tushnet, ConstitutionalInterpretation and
JudicialSelextion: A Viewfimn the FederalistPapers,61 CAL. L. Rgv. 1669 (1988).
102 Younger, 401 U.S. at 41 (emphasis
added).
101 The concurring opinion also applies to Samuels v. Mackeg 401 U.S. 66 (1971),
Fernandez v. Macke/g 401 U.S. 66 (1971), Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971), and
Byrnev. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
Younger, 401 U.S. at 54-55 (StewartJ, concurring).
109 Id at 55 (StewartJ., concurring).
106 Id. at 56 (StewartJ., concurring).
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The import of the pending state proceeding was further emphasized by the Court's later decision in Steffel v. Thompson." In Steffel,
the Supreme Court answered the question specifically reserved in
Samuel. '°8 "[W]hether declaratory relief is precluded when a state
prosecution has been threatened, but is not pending, and a showing
of bad faith enforcement or other special circumstances has not
been made."'09 The Supreme Court was advised at oral argument
that a state court proceeding was concurrently addressing the same
issues presented in the federal court." Nevertheless, the Court refused to abstain."'
The litigant in Steffel was not involved in any pending state court
proceedings but had been threatened with arrest under a state
criminal statute."' Steffel filed suit in the district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief restraining the respondents from enforcing a state statute in violation of his protected constitutional
rights. The district court, however, denied all requested relief, finding the suit lacking in "'the rudiments of an active controversy between the parties.'" ' " Plaintiff Steffel appealed the denial of declaratory relief
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
11 4
Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit recognized that Younger and Samuels were expressly limited to circumstances where state prosecutions were pending when the federal action was initiated, but the court refused to
grant relief based on the opinion that the irreparable injury standard
also applied to requests "'for injunctive relief against threatened state
court criminal prosecution' as well as against a pending prosecution

107

415 U.S. 452 (1974).

108 See Steffel 415 U.S. at 454; see also Younger, 401 U.S. at 73-74.

109 Steffel 415 U.S. at 454. In Steff, Guy Steffel and a companion were handbilling against American involvement in Vietnam at the North Dekalb Shopping Center. See id. at 455. Police officers told them to stop handbilling or they would face
arrest. See id. While Mr. Steffel ceased handbilling when he left the shopping center, his companion stayed on the premises, continued handbilling, and was arrested. See id, at 455-56.
110 See id. at 456 n.6. Steffel's companion pursued a claim for relief
in the state
court system, while Steffel, who was not arrested, pursued a claim for relief through
the federal court system. See id. at 456.
111 See id. at 472, 475.

1
See id. at 456 & n.4. The threatened charge was criminal trespass in violation
of Georgia Code Annotated § 26-1503 (1972). See id. at 456.
1 Id. (citation omitted).
114 See id. Steffel abandoned his appeal from denial of injunctive
relief in his appellate brief and, instead, appealed only the denial of declaratory relief. See id. at

456 n.6.
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....
""s Steffel then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Writing for the Court, and reaffirming the need for sensitivity toward
the notions enumerated in Younger, Justice Brennan observed that
"[n]either Younger nor Samuels, however, decided the question
whether federal intervention might be permissible in the absence of
a pending state prosecution.""" The Steffel decision answered this
question by holding:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the
federal complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in
duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal
justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance,
be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles.
The Court observed that in Roe v. Wade,"' while the prosecution
of Dr. Halliford for violating a Texas abortion law was pending, the
federal court was not prevented from granting plaintiff Roe, against
whom no action was pending, a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional."g Justice Brennan stated: "The relevant
principles of equity, comity, and federalism 'have little force in the
absence of a pending state proceeding.'" ' 2 The focus, therefore, is on
pending state action against the federal plaintiff rather than pending
state action against some other third party. Although similar questions may be litigated in the state claim, "[a]bstention would be im-

SSteffe4 415 U.S at 457.

Id. at 461.
Id. at 462. "Appellants in these two cases were all indicted in a New York
State
Court on charges of criminal anarchy." Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 67 (1971).
Steffel pointed out that in the absence of a pending state action, the Abstention Doctrine is not applicable:
[WIhile a pending state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with
a concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal
on the part of the federal courts to intervene when no state proceeding is pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he
believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding.
SteffeK 415 U.S. at 462. In ConnecticutMagazine v. Moraghan, 676 F. Supp. 38, 41-42
(D. Conn. 1987), the court refused to abstain in a case involving a federal plaintiff
who was not a party to the underlying state action and who filed a federal challenge
to the enforcement of a state court order. There was no pending prosecution
against the federal plaintiff and no adequate remedy available; therefore, the court
refused to abstain. See id.
11 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
119 See Stffel 415 U.S. at 471 n.19.
12
Id. at 462 (emphasis added) (quoting Lake Carriers Ass'n. v. MacMullan, 406
U.S. 498, 509 (1972)).
"

11
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proper in a case merely because the same federal
law questions pre2
sented are also being litigated in another case."

1

In Wooley v. Maynard/" the federal plaintiff was arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced for violating the state law that required the display of a particular license plate on all automobiles
registered within the state. After serving his sentence, the state court
defendant filed a claim in federal court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the state statute, claiming it violated the First Amendment. '"
In addressing the principles of equitable restraint enunciated in
Younger, the Supreme Court noted that the federal plaintiff was not
attempting to annul the results of a state trial, but rather was trying
to obtain prospective relief to preclude future prosecution under the
statute. Under those circumstances, the federal plaintiff could not
"be denied consideration of a federal remedy.""'
Thus, the two pillars of Younger are (1) a pending state proceeding and (2) the presence of the same party in both the federal and
state actions. The Younger Abstention Doctrine does not apply when
there is no pending state proceeding against the federal plaintiff at
the time the federal complaint is filed.
2. The Expansion of the Younger Abstention Doctrine
The Supreme Court's decision in Younger dealt only with federal
court intervention in pending, ongoing state criminal prosecutions.
Since the Court's 1971 opinion, however, the Younger Abstention
Doctrine has been expanded to apply to more than just state criminal proceedings.
a. Declaratory Relief
The same day in which Younger was decided, the Court handed
down Samuels v. Mackell," which expanded Younger's proscription
against federal injunctive relief involving a pending state criminal
proceeding to apply also to declaratory relief. Applying the Younger
Abstention Doctrine, the Samuels Court declined federal intervention in
an ongoing state proceeding despite that the plaintiff requested both
injunctive and declaratory relief.'2 In Samuels, the Supreme Court
1
2
'2

124

CoHin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 683 (E.D.

430 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1977).
See id. at 709.
See id. at 711.

125 1&.

M 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971).
12

Sm id.at 72.

Ml1.
1978).
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found very little difference between injunctive and declaratory relief because
[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act provides that after a declaratory
judgment is issued the district court may enforce it by granting
"[f urther necessary or proper relief," and therefore a declaratory
judgment issued while state proceedings are pending might serve
as the basis for a subsequent injunction against those proceedings
to "protect or effectuate" the declaratory judgment, and thus result in
a clearly improper interference with the state proceed12
ings. 8
The Supreme Court therefore held that,
in cases where the state criminal prosecution was begun prior to
the federal suit, the same equitable principles relevant to the
propriety of an injunction must be taken into consideration by
federal district courts in determining whether to issue a declaratory judgment, in that wherein an injunction would be impermissible under these principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily
be denied as well.
The Court also made dear its decision did not suggest that a dedaratoryjudgment should never be issued in cases where injunctive relief would be considered improper.'" The Court pointed out that "there
may be unusual circumstances [where, even though] an injunction
might be withheld,. . . a declaratory judgment might be appropriate and
might not be contrary to the basic equitable doctrines governing the
availability of relief.""'
b.

Quasi-Criminal Proceedings

The next expansion occurred in 1975 with Huffman v. Pursue,
where the Court expanded Younger to encompass quasicriminal cases."
Huffman involved an Ohio public nuisance statute
that provided, inter alia, that a place exhibiting obscene films was considered a nuisance.M Any establishment violating the statute was subject
Ltd.,"' 2

12Id.
2

I

(citations omitted).
i at 73.

id
Id.
1
420 U.S. 592 (1975).
1
The Court based its decision in part on the finding that the civil enforcement
was "in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes." Huffimn, 420 U.S. at 604. In
his dissent, Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Douglas and Marshall joined, vig.
orously contested the above quoted language as "the first step toward extending to
state civil proceedings generally the holding" in Younger, an extension with which
thepJustice disagreed. Id. at 613-18 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Se
&id.
131
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to closure for up to one year and any items considered obscene were
subject to a forced sale.'ss In Huffman, a state trial court ruled in favor of
the city in an action brought against a theater owner. Instead of appealing the state decision, the theater owner filed suit in the federal district
court, alleging that the city's use of the statute deprived the owner of
certain constitutional rights. The owner sought both injunctive and declaratory relief."
The district court found the nuisance statute unconstitutional under the First Amendment and enjoined execution of the state court's
judgment. The Supreme Court noted that the federalism principle
enunciated in Younger applied with equal force to civil proceedings that
essentially were quasi-criminal in nature"
The Court found critical
similarities between a criminal prosecution and the Ohio nuisance proceedings.'4
The Court found that the Younger Abstention Doctrine
should apply in part because the theater owner could have reached the
Supreme Court by proceeding through the state appellate process. Instead, the theater sought to use the federal court as a type of an appellate court over the state court proceeding!"
c.

Quasi-Judicial Proceedings

Following Huffman, the Court inexorably expanded Younger to
include not only quasi-criminal cases,"' but quasi-judicial cases.141 In
another case that arose out of the state of Ohio, a religious school
brought a civil rights action against the Ohio Civil Rights Commission,
seeking to enjoin the Commission from exercising jurisdiction over a
sex-discrimination complaint brought by a discharged teacher. After a
pregnant teacher was told that her employment contract would not be
renewed because of the school's religious doctrine that mothers should
stay at home with their pre-school children, she contacted an attorney
who threatened suit. 42 The school then rescinded its decision not to
13 Seid
1 S e id. at 604.
138 Seeid
139

Se Huffinan, 420 US. at 605-06.

See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (applying Younger to a Texas child welfare agency involving the loss of custody of a child based on allegations of child
abuse); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (applying Younger to attachment
proceedings); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (applying the principles of
Younger abstention to appeals of contempt of court in judgment creditor action).
141 See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc.,
477 U.S.
619 (1986); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Middlesex County
Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
SSee Dayton Ctistian Sd., 477 US. at
619.
140
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renew the teacher, but terminated her anyway because of her violation
of its internal dispute resolution doctrine. The teacher then filed a
complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. The Commission initiated administrative proceedings against the school.'" During the pendency of the administrative proceedings, the religious school filed suit in
federal district court seeking an injunction against the administrative
process. The district court refused to enter an injunction, but the court
of appeals reversed, relying on the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.'" The Supreme Court ruled
that the federal courts should have abstained from adjudicating the case
under the Younger Abstention Doctrine. 4 The Court therefore held
that the Younger Abstention Doctrine was applicable to quasi-judicial
proceedings."
d.

Civil Proceedings

The Supreme Court eventually expanded the Younger Abstention Doctrine to civil proceedings.14 7 In Penzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,' a
judgment debtor filed suit in federal district court challenging a Texas
state courtjudgment in excess of $11 billion and further challenged the
constitutionality of the Texas judgment lien and appeal bond provisions
that required that a bond be posted in excess of $13 billion. Under
Texas law, a judgment creditor can execute a lien on a judgment
debtor's property unless the debtor files a supersedeas bond in at least
the amount of the judgment plus interest and costs.'" After the jury's
verdict, but before the trial court entered judgment, it was dear that
Texaco would not be able to post a bond in the amount of $13 billion.
As Texaco would not be able to post such a high bond, Penzoil would
have been able to commence enforcement of the judgment on the ver-

143

145

e

d

See id. at 619-20.
See id at 620. Citing Gibson v. BenyhilJ 411 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1933), the Court

noted that administrative proceedings looking toward the revocation of a license to practice medicine may in certain circumstances command a respect equal to typical court
proceedings. The Court also pointed out that abstention may apply to preclude a federal
court from enjoining lawyer disciplinary proceedings initiated by state ethics committees.
See Ohio CvP Rights Commn, 477 U.S. at 628 (concluding that administrative proceedings
involving Bar disciplinary actions are "judidalin nature") (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982)).
1
Dayton ChisianSch., 477 U.S. at 628.
1
See, e.g., Pennzoil v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987), in which neither party was the
state.
148

M

149

Seeid. at6.
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dict even before Texaco's appeal had been resolved." Therefore, Texaco filed suit in federal district court daiming that the proceedings violated rights secured by the Constitution and various federal statutes.
Texaco asked the district court to enjoin Penzoil from taking any enforcement action; the court ruled in favor of Texaco and issued a preliminary injunction. "' Applying the Younger Abstention Doctrine, the
Supreme Court ruled that the court should have abstained under principles of federalism.'5 2 More particularly, the Court pointed to the fact
that the Texas courts never had the opportunity to construe the statute
and thus federal intervention would have deprived the Texas courts of
"an opportunity to adjudicate [the] constitutional daims."155 In making
this statement, the Supreme Court dearly had in mind the principles
enunciated in the Pullman Abstention Doctrine. The Supreme Court
did not highlight that this case involved purely a civil matter, but it is
dear that the Court extended the Abstention Doctrine to civil proceedings.
IV. THE ROOKER-FLDMANABSTENTION DOCTRINE

The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine originated in the cases
of Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.'5 and District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman.'" The concept underlying the Rooker-FeldmanAbstention
Doctrine is that Congress has conferred only original jurisdiction,
not appellate jurisdiction, on the federal district courts. The RookerFeldman Abstention Doctrine exists to prevent a state court party
from having two bites at the apple: one through the state courts with
a petition to the United States Supreme Court, and the other
through a subsequent collateral attack originating in the federal
courts. Thus, a party may not begin litigating constitutional matter
in state court, stop short of petitioning the United States Supreme
Court, and then begin litigating the same matter in federal district
court. The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine essentially holds that
the federal district court does not have appellate jurisdiction over
the state court. The avenue for the state court party is to continue
through the state court proceeding up to the United States Supreme
Court if possible. The Rooker-FeldmanAbstention Doctrine is inapplicable, however, in cases where the federal plaintiff was not a party to

'

Seeid. at8.

152 See id. at
15
154

10.
SPenzoi4 481 US. at 17.
263 U.S. 413 (1923).

I 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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the state court Proceeding. 15 In addition, the Supreme Court in
Martin v. Wilks' clearly established that a federal plaintiff is not required to intervene in a state court proceeding in order to protect
threatened constitutional rights:
Petitioners argue that, because respondents failed to timely intervene in the initial proceedings, their current challenge to actions
taken under the consent decree constitutes an impermissible
"collateral attack".... The position has sufficient appeal to have
commanded the approval of a great majority of federal courts of
appeal but we agree with the contrary view.... The law does not
impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger.'5
T See United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995). The Sixth Circuit in Owens observed:
Neither the Postal Service nor any other federal defendant was a party
to the action in the Ohio courts.... Clearly, a party cannot be said to
be appealing a decision by a state court when it was not a party to the
case. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not apply to bar a suit in federal court brought by a party that was not a party in a preceding action
in state court. ... A party has no obligation to attempt to intervene in
a state court action when it is not named in the suit in order to preserve its rights. Because the Postal Service was not a party in a state
court action in this case, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not apply
and the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction.
Id. In Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1992), the Third Circuit stated that it
could find "no authority which would extend the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine to persons
not parties to the proceedings before the State Supreme Court." Vaknti 962 F.2d at
297-98. In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 598 (1975), however, the federal
party was also party to a state court action prior to the time the federal suit was initiated. The federal plaintiff sought federal court review of a state court ruling. Following the entry ofjudgment by the state court, the state court defendant filed suit
in federal court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to enjoin prosecution.
"Rather than appealing [the state court] judgment within the Ohio court system,
[the state court defendants] immediately filed suit in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Ohio." 420 U.S. at 598. Here Rooker-Feldman abstention was appropriate because the state court parties sought to use the federal
courts as an appellate court.
157 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
158

Id. at 762-63 (citations omitted). In Huffman the Court addressed the issue of

exhausting state remedies. At the time the state court party filed suit in federal district court, "it had available the remedy of appeal to the Ohio Appellate Court." 420
U.S. at 610. Huffman clarified its opinion, stating:
By requiring an exhaustion of state appellate remedies for the purpose of applying Younger, we in no way undermine Monroe v. Pape
There we held that one seeking redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
deprivation of federal rights need not first initiate state proceedings
based on related state causes of action. Monroe v. Pape had nothing to
do with the problem presently before us, that of the deference to be
accorded state proceedings which have already been initiated and which
afford a competent tinbunalfor the resolution offederal issues.
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Indeed, the Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine does not require "that persons claiming a violation of their federal rights have
an obligation before turning to a federal court to see whether there
is some state court proceeding that they might join in order to present their federal claims there. "1 "A nonparty is not precluded from
relitigating matters decided in a prior action simply because it passed
by an opportunity to intervene. "
Moreover, as the Supreme Court
stated in Steffel v. Thompson, a federal plaintiff is not required "first to
seek vindication of his federal rights in a state declaratory judgment
action."' A federal plaintiff is "not required to utilize state judicial
remedies before,
or instead of, bringing a Section 1983 action in
62
federal court.'
V. THE BRILLHARTABSTENTION DOCTRINE
The BrillhartAbstention Doctrine had its origins in the case of
Brillhartv. Excess Insurance Co.6 To apply Brillhartproperly, it is essential to understand that the facts of the case dealt with (1) apending parallel state suit and (2) the Declaratory Judgment Act.' Anticipating a coercive suit, an insurance company sought declaratory

Our exhaustion requirement is likewise not inconsistent with such
cases as City Bank Farmers' Trust Company v. Shnader and Bacon v. Rut-

land RR Company, which expressed the doctrine that a federal equity
plaintiff challenging a state administrative action need not have exhausted his state judicial remedies. Those cases did not deal with
situations in which the state judicial process had been initiated.
Hurmn,420 U.S. at 609 n.21 (emphasis added).
Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1995).
16 Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Bickham v. Lashof,
620 F.2d 1238, 1243-45 (7th Cir. 1980).
161 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974).
162 Leaf v. Supreme Court, 979 F.2d 589, 598 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Patsy v.
Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982)). In Guarino v. Larson, 11 F.3d 1151
(3d Cir. 1993), the Third Circuit noted:
Our holding only applies where a litigant has been summoned to participate in a state court proceeding or has voluntarily chosen a state
forum for some of his or her claims. In such cases, a litigant must
present all of his or her claims arising from the same transaction in
order to avoid waiving those claims he or she does not raise. We are
not asserting that a litigant who has an opportunity to choose between
a state or federal forum to raise his or her initial claim must choose a
state forum in order to avoid waiver.
Guarino, 11 F.3d at 1161 n.7.
M 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
IN 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1988). The Act provides that a court "may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration."
Id.
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relief in federal court of nonliability on an insurance policy. The issues presented in the federal court involved only state claims that
were parallel to the issues in a pending state proceeding. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit,
agreeing that although the district court had jurisdiction to hear the
suit "it was under no compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction."'6 5
The Supreme Court also agreed that, when federal courts are presented with a suit under the DeclaratoryJudgment Act and there is a
pending parallel state proceeding, the question is whether the controversy16 6"can better be settled in the proceeding pending in the state
court."

Some time after Brillhart was decided the Supreme Court
handed down Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
State 7 and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp. 16 8 Under the ColoradoRiverAbstention Doctrine, a federal court
may abstain only under "exceptional circumstances." 6 A split of
opinion arose among the courts of appeals wherein some held that a
federal court may stay a declaratory judgment action in favor of a
pending parallel state proceeding under only exceptional circumstances,"0 while others held that the more discretionary Brillhart
standard applies to declaratory actions when there is a parallel state
proceeding."" The Supreme Court resolved this dispute in Wilton v.

1

Bril/hart,316 U.S. at 494.
Id. at 495. Although Brillhart did not set out an exclusive list of factors gov-

erning a federal court's exercise of this discretion, it did provide some useful guidance. For example, the district court should examine "the scope of the pending
state court proceeding and the nature of the defenses open there." Id. This inquiry
requires the court to consider "whether the claims of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that proceeding, whether necessary parties have been
joined, whether such parties are amenable to process in that proceeding, etc." Id.
"[Ait least where another suit involving the same parties and presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues is pending in state court, a district
court might be indulging in '[g]ratuitous interference,' if it permitted the federal
declaratory action to proceed." Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 283 (1995)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Bri/hart,316 U.S. at 495).
167

424 U.S. 800 (1976).

16 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
169

Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813-14.

170

See, e.g., Employers Ins. v. Missouri Elec. Works, 23 F.3d 1372, 1374 n.3 (8th

Cir. 1994) (holding that, pursuant to Colorado River and Moses H. Cone, a district
court may not stay or dismiss a declaratory judgment action absent "exceptional circumstances"); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust, 806 F.2d
411, 413 (2d Cir. 1986) (same).
I See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Fed., Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 778
n.12 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding the "exceptional circumstances" test of Colorado River
and Moses H. Cone inapplicable in declaratory judgment actions); Mitcheson v. Har-
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Seven Falls Co.'7 The Court noted that Brillhart had not been overruled by ColoradoRiver or Moses H. Cone in that neither case dealt with
the Declaratory Judgment Act. 7' "Since its inception, the Declara-

toryJudgment Act has been understood to confer on federal courts
unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the

rights of litigants." 7' The Wilton Court noted that the Declaratory
Judgment Act creates "an opportunity, rather than a duty," to grant
relief to qualifying litigants.
The rule then under the Brillhart Abstention Doctrine is that,
when a federal court is faced with a suit involving the resolution of

state issues brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act by parties
who are also parties in a pending parallel state proceeding, the court
has substantial discretion to stay the proceedings in favor of the
pending state suit.76 In such a case, the Colorado River and Moses H.

Cone "exceptional circumstances" test is inapplicable.'"
VI. THE COLORADO RIVERABSTENTION DOCTRINE
The Colorado RiverAbstention Doctrine originated in the case of
Colorado River Water ConservationDistrict v. United States.' 78 Consideraris, 955 F.2d 235, 237-38 (4th Cir. 1992) (same).
'" 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
173

See id. at 285.

Id.; see also E. BoRctAR, DEcIARAroRYJuDGMNTs 312-14 (2d ed. 1941); E.
Borchard, Discretion to Refuse Jurisdictionof Actions for DeclaratoryJudgments, 26 MINN.
L. REv. 677 (1942); D. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. RLv. 543
(1985).
175 Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288.
176 See id. at 289.
174

1"

Seeid.

178 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Colorado River involved the management and allocation
of water. See id. at 804. Colorado enacted legislation under which the state was divided into seven water divisions, each with a procedure designed to resolve disputes
regarding water claims. See id. Seeking to adjudicate reserved rights claimed on
behalf of itself and certain Indian tribes, as well as rights based on state law in one
of the water divisions, the United States, which had previously asserted non-Indian
reserved water rights in three other state water divisions, brought suit in federal district court. See id. at 805. One of the federal defendants sought in state court to
make the government a party to proceedings in one of the water divisions for the
purposes of adjudicating all of the government's claims, both state and federal, pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666. See id. at 806. This law requires consent to join the United States in any suit (1) for the adjudication of water
rights or (2) the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United
States owns or is acquiring such rights by appropriation under state law or otherwise. See id. at 803 n.1. The district court dismissed the action based on abstention,
but the court of appeals reversed. See id. at 806. The Supreme Court found that
abstention was not proper under any existing theory but, nevertheless, granted dis,missal. See id. at 817-21.
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tions underlying the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine include the
conservation ofjudicial resources and the comprehensive disposition
of litigation."" Under the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine, a federal court may abstain from hearing a claim when there is a Rending
The
state proceeding only under "exceptional circumstances." '
ColoradoRiver Court found exceptional circumstances under the facts
of the case:
[The] Court deemed dispositive a clear federal policy against
piecemeal adjudication or water rights; the absence of any proceedings in the District Court, other than the filing of the complaint, prior to the motion to dismiss; the extensive nature of the
suit; the 300-mile distance between the District Court and the situs of the water district at issue; and the prior participation of the
Federal Government in related state proceedings.'8 '
The Court noted that as between state and federal courts the
rule is that the "'pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to
proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having
jurisdiction.'""" As between federal district courts, there is no similar
rule, but "the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation."'"
In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal, the federal court may
consider factors such as the inconvenience of the federal forum, the
desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, and the order in which
jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent fora. No one factor is
necessarily determinative and only "the clearest of justifications will
warrant dismissal."'" When considering these various factors, the
Supreme Court in Colorado River noted that
Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. The doctrine of abstention, under which a district court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its
jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty
of a district court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.
Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the
order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve
an important countervailing interest. "[It was never a doctrine

19 See id. at 817.
IS Id. at813-14.
11 Wi/tgn, 515 U.S. at 284.
* Id. (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)).
18
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
"M

Id. at 818-19.
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of equity that a federal court should exercise judicial discretions to
1
dismiss a suit merely because a State court could entertain it."'

The key to the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine is to determine whether there is a parallel state proceeding that can provide
complete relief.'" The parallel factor and the availability of complete
relief are, "for all practical purposes, identical.""" "A suit is 'parallel'

when substantially the same parties are contemporaneously litigating
substantially the same issues in another forum, thus making it likely
that judgment in one suit will have a res judicataeffect on the other
suit. "l
Colorado River abstention is inappropriate in this case because the
defendants failed to satisfy the threshold requirement that there
be a concurrent state court proceeding.... [We] feel compelled
to accept the plaintiffs allegation that the state court proceeding
is over and done with. Accordingly we must conclude that there
is no pending state proceeding and the Colorado River abstention
does not apply.'"
The Colorado River Abstention Doctrine clearly does not apply if
substantially the same parties litigating substantially the same issue in
a federal court have ceased their litigation in the state courts.'" In
addition, if the federal plaintiff is not a party to the ongoing state
court proceeding, then ColoradoRiver likewise does not apply.'
VII. APPLYING THE PULLMAN, YOUNGER, ROOKER-FELDMAN, BRILLHART,
AND COLORADO RVERABSTENTION DOCTRINES

The Pullman Abstention Doctrine does not apply when the state
law is clear and unambiguous, the state courts have interpreted the
183Id. at 813-14 (citations and quotations omitted).

n SeeBaskin v. Bath Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 15 F.3d 569, 571 (6th Cir.
1994) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983)).
18 Heitmanis v. Austin, 899 F.2d 521, 528 (6th
Cir. 1990).
188 Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1229
n.1 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Strasen v. Strasen, 897 F. Supp. 1179, 1186 (E.D. Wis.

1995); Burnstein v. Hosiery Mfg. Corp., 850 F. Supp. 176 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
180

Strasen, 897 F. Supp. at 1186 (citations omitted).
See Leaf v. Supreme Court, 979 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1992). Abstention is im-

proper where there is no pending proceeding in a state court. See, e.g., Aekenbrandtv. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
191 In the context of abstention generally, see United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271,

274 (6th Cir. 1995), Hooverv. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845,849 (7th Cir. 1995), and Bickham
v. Lashof,620 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 756
(1989); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472 (1974) ("requiring the federal
courts totally to step aside when no state [litigation] is pending against the federal
plaintiff would turn federalism on its head").
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state law, or even where the state courts have had the opportunity to
interpret the state law but have failed or refused to do so. Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's expansion of Younger,
the Younger Abstention Doctrine does not apply when there is no
pending state proceeding against the federal plaintiff at the time the
federal complaint is filed. The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine
does not apply if the federal plaintiff is not using the federal court
system as a type of appellate panel to review the state court ruling.
Rooker-Feldman is only concerned with a federal plaintiff who begins
in the state court system and fails to exhaust the state court appellate
process. For example, Rooker-Feldman would apply to prohibit federal
court intervention in a case where a state court plaintiff proceeds
with litigation through the state court system and then, not content
with the decision, begins litigating the same issue again in the federal district court. The BrillhartAbstention Doctrine applies only to
circumstances involving a federal suit addressing state issues under
the Declaratory Judgment Act with parties who are also parties to a
pending parallel state proceeding. The Colorado River Abstention
Doctrine is not applicable when substantially the same parties are
not litigating substantially the same issues in a state forum. Colorado
River is inapplicable if the state proceedings have terminated or if
the federal plaintiff was not a party to the state action.
In order to illustrate the application of these doctrines, focus
will now turn toward the case of Cheffer v. McGregor 92 In Cheffer, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit allowed federal intervention to block enforcement of a state court injunction
that established "buffer zones" around a Florida abortion clinic.19 3
The state court injunction, styled after Women's Health Care Center,
Inc. v. OperationRescue,'M involved a conflict that arose when abortion
opponents began picketing the Aware Woman's Center for Choice,
an abortion clinic located in a residential neighborhood in Melbourne, Florida. In September 1992, the state court judge entered a
permanent injunction prohibiting certain named defendants from
trespassing upon the private property of the clinic and from physically blocking, impeding, or obstructing access to or egress from the
'92

6 F.3d 705 (llth Cir. 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 41 F.3d

1421 (llth Cir. 1993) (en banc).
1 See Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 712. Although the holding in Cheffer was vacated, the
Eleventh Circuit did so to allow the district court to consider what impact, if any,
the United States Supreme Court decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,

512 U.S. 753 (1994), had on the holding.
14 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993), rev'd in part, aff'd in part sub nom Madsen v.

Woman's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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abortion clinic.'95 During February and March of 1993, a new campaign was launched against the abortion clinic. The original named
defendants were not involved in this renewed picketing effort. ' In
April, however, state court judge Robert B. McGregor issued an
amended permanent injunction directed against the same previously
named defendants and those acting "in concert" with them.'
This
1 See OperationRescue, 626 So. 2d at 666.
1

See Mathew D. Staver, Injunctive Relief and the Madsen Test, 14 ST. Louis U.

PUB. L. REv. 465, 466-69 (1995).

The injunction was directed against Operation Rescue, Operation Rescue
America, Operation Goliath, Ed Martin, Bruce Cadle, Pat Mahoney, Randall Terry,
Judy Madsen, Shirley Hobbs, and all persons acting in concert or participation with
them or on their behalf, with notice in any manner or by any means of the order.
The injunction then enjoined the defendants from the following:
(1) At all times on all days, from entering the premises and property
of the Aware Woman Center for Choice, Inc....
(2) At all times on all days, from blocking, impeding, inhibiting, or in
any other manner obstructing or interfering with access to, ingress
into and egress from any building or parking lot of the Clinic.
(3) At all times on all days, from congregating, picketing, patrolling,
demonstrating or entering that portion of public right-of-way or private property within thirty-six (36) feet of the property line of the
Clinic... An exception to the 36-foot buffer zone is the area immediately adjacent to the Clinic on the east. ...
The [defendants]
...must remain at least five (5) feet from the Clinic's east line. Another exception to the 36-foot buffer zone relates to the record tide
owners of the property to the north and west of the Clinic. The prohibition against entry into the 36 foot buffer zones does not apply to
such persons and their invitees. The other prohibitions contained
herein do apply, if such owners and their invitees are acting in concert
with the [defendants]....
(4) During the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon, on Mondays
through Saturdays, during surgical procedures and recovery periods,
from singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns,
auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other sounds or images
observable to or within earshot of the patients inside the Clinic.
(5) At all times on all days, in an area within three-hundred (300)
feet of the Clinic, from physically approaching any person seeking the
services of the Clinic unless such person indicates a desire to communicate by approaching or by inquiring of the [defendants]. In the
event of such invitation, the [defendants] may engage in communications consisting of conversation of a nonthreatening nature and by the
delivery of literature within the three-hundred (300) foot area but in
no event within the 36 foot buffer zone. Should any individual decline such communication, otherwise known as "sidewalk counseling,"
that person shall have the absolute right to leave or walk away and the
[defendants] shall not accompany such person, encircle, surround,
harass, threaten or physically or verbally abuse those individuals who
choose -notto communicate with them.
(6) At all times on all days, from approaching, congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or using bullhorns or other sound am1
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new injunction created a thirty-six-foot buffer zone surrounding the
abortion clinic encompassing a public right-of-way, public sidewalk,
and street. The named defendants and those "acting in concert"
with them were forbidden from entering this speech-free zone. The
state court injunction also prohibited any pro-life image that could
be observed from within the clinic and required that the pro-life
speaker first receive consent from any person associated with, or
seeking services from, the clinic before speaking or distributing literature to them within a three-hundred-foot buffer zone around the
clinic. A three-hundred-foot buffer zone was also placed around any
residential area where any owner, employee, or volunteer lived.'"
After the issuance of the amended permanent injunction, a
number of pro-life individuals were arrested for entering the thirtysix-foot buffer zone. Myrna Cheffer was not among those arrested.
She filed suit in federal district court against the state court judge,
however, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the state court injunction
because the vagueness and overbreadth of the injunction caused her
to fear prosecution. Cheffer stated that she did not condone or participate in trespassing or blockading activities. She did, however, fear
plification equipment within three-hundred (300) feet of the residence of any of the [Clinic's] employees, staff, owners or agents, or
blocking or attempting to block, barricade, or in any other manner,
temporarily or otherwise, obstruct the entrances, exits or driveways of
the residences of any of the [Clinic's] employees, staff, owners or
agents, or blocking or attempting to block, barricade, or in any other
manner, temporarily or otherwise, obstruct the entrances, exits or
driveways or the residences of any of the [Clinic's] employees, staff,
owners or agents. The [defendants] and those acting in concert with
them are prohibited from inhibiting or impeding or attempting to
impede, temporarily or otherwise, the free ingress or egress of persons
to any street that provides the sole access to the street on which those
residences are located.
(7) At all times on all days, from physically abusing, grabbing, intimidating, harassing, touching, pushing, shoving, crowding or assaulting
persons entering or leaving, working at or using services at the
[Abortion] Clinic or trying to gain access to, or leave, any of the
homes of owners, staff or patients of the Clinic.
(8) At all times on all days, from harassing, intimidating or physically
abusing, assaulting or threatening any present or former doctor,
health care professional, or other staff member, employee or volunteer who assists in providing services at the [Abortion] Clinic.
(9) At all times on all days, from encouraging, inciting, or securing
other person to commit any of the prohibited acts listed herein.
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759-60; Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 679-80. A map attached
to the injunction indicated a buffer zone that included a public sidewalk in front of
the clinic as well as a public street and an adjacent right-of-way. See Operation Rescue,
626 So. 2d at 682; Staver, supranote 196, at 486.
1 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 760.
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prosecution for violating the order through application of the "in
concert" section by merely entering the thirty-six-foot buffer zone.
Cheffer stated that she knew of others who were neither named in
the injunction nor acted in concert with any of the named defendants but who had been prosecuted under the injunction after entering the buffer zone expressing a pro-life message. Indeed, during
court proceedings the state court judge stated that the in unction
was intended to apply against anyone with a "pro-life" view. 9 Cheffer therefore brought suit in federal court seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against the state court injunction.'
In Cheffer, the defendant argued that the Abstention Doctrine
should bar Cheffer's federal suit. First, the defendant argued that since
Cheffer was represented by the same attorney who represented the state
court defendants, Cheffer's interests would be adequately defended.
Second, she could intervene in the ongoing state proceedings. Third,
Cheffer could file an amicus brief. Finally, the defendant argued that
imposing a federal injunction against a state injunction could ultimately
result in the state court judge being found in contempt of a federal
court order if the state court continued to enforce the state ordered injunction. According to the defendant, allowing such a dash between
the federal and state systems would cause a calamitous result.
In the district court, Cheffer claimed that the injunction acted
as a prior restraint on her free speech rights and that the threat of
prosecution chilled her ability to exercise those rights.2 1 She sought
both declaratory and injunctive relief alleging a violation of her civil
rights using 28 U.S.C. § 1983.m The district court denied motions
199 See id. at 795 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also
Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 711 (11th Cir. 1993); Stayer, supra note 196, at
476.
20 Cheffer asked the federal court to enjoin enforcement
of the "in concert"
provision of the state court injunction from being applied against anyone who
merely espoused a pro-life viewpoint if they were not actively aiding and abetting
the named state court defendants. Alternatively, Cheffer requested declaratory relief. Specifically, Cheffer asked the federal court to declare that the "in concert"
provision could not be applied against any person with a pro-life view without proof
that the demonstrator knowingly aided and abetted the state court defendants. See
Chffer- 6 F.3d at 705.
2rSee
id. at 707-08.
See id. at 708. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
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for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, finding that the balance of equities did not weigh in Cheffer's favor."3
Cheffer appealed the district court decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which ruled that Cheffer
had standing to sue, that the Abstention Doctrine did not apply, and
that she met the necessary criteria for injunctive relief.
A. Application ofPullman
Pullman and its progeny dealt with a statute, regulation, or perhaps an ordinance but never an injunction.2 In Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, the Supreme Court discussed the differences beother proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
203 See Cheffet, 6 F.3d
at 708.
Se id. at 709-10.
See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941). See,
e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (involving state law controversy
over a city ordinance); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)
(concerning the constitutionality of the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (regarding state public nuisance statute);
Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970) (questioning the constitutionality of state
fishing laws and regulations); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967) (concerning
challenge to a New York penal statute).
512 U.S. 753 (1994). The petitioners in Madsen were some of the same
named defendants in the state court case known as Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Operation Rescue discussed above. The injunction at issue in Madsen was the same injunction at issue in Cheffer. The difference between the two cases is that Madsen
dealt with the named state court defendants while Cheffer dealt with the application
of the same injunction to nonparties through the "in concert" provision. The Supreme Court in Madsen found that, as applied to the state court defendants, the injunction was a content-neutral restriction. This was because the injunction took into consideration past actions and attempted to restrain those activities. However, the same state
court injunction would probably operate as a content-based restriction when applied
against nonparties who had no past history of illegal behavior. See Machesky v. Bizell, 414
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) (permitting a federal injunction against a state court injunction
that the federal court found to be unconstitutionally overbroad because it lumped protected speech with unprotected speech in such a way as to abridge important public interests). "Maches" holds that where an injunction is attacked on First Amendment
grounds and is facially overbroad, abstention for comity and federalism reasons is inappropriate." McKusick v. City of Melbourne, 96 F.3d 478, 489 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996). The
McKusidk court incorrectly assumed that since the Madsen injunction was found to be content-neutral as applied to parties, it was also content-neutral as applied to nonparties. See
McaKusick 96 F.3d at 488-89. The Supreme Court in Madsen addressed only parties and
specifically indicated that the parties were prohibited from challenging the "in concert"
section since this did not apply to them. Thus, Madsen addressed only the application of
the injunction to the state defendants, see Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S.
753, 775-76 (1994), whereas CLeffer addressed only the "in concert" provision. See Cheffer
v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 708-11 (11th Cir. 1993). It is clear that a state court injunction
taking into consideration past illegal behavior may operate as a content-neutral restriction on such activities, but the same injunction operating like a statute and applied
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tween an injunction and an ordinance or statute. A judge is
"charged with fashioning a remedy for a specific deprivation," not
"with the drafting of a statute addressed to the general public."" In
discussing the "obvious differences... between an injunction and a
generally applicable ordinance," the Court noted that an ordinance
reflects a legislative preference to promote a particular societal interest whereas an injunction is a remedy "imposed for violation.., of
a legislative or judicial decree."2" For the purposes of applying Pullman, the differences between an injunction and a statute are really
irrelevant, except any injunction has already been favored with a judicial decree while a statute may never have had its day in court. In
Pullman, the Court stated that the question of state law rested with
the Texas Supreme Court because the interpretation of the statute
was "far from clear."2" The Court expressed concern that a later ruling by the state court would result in an apparent contradiction requiring the issue to be relitigated in the federal court forum.21 Pullman may apply when the state law is subject to more than one
interpretation and the state courts have not had the opportunity to
interpret its meaning. An injunction, however, by its very nature, has
already been crafted by a state court. Pullman should rarely, if ever,
apply to a state court injunction.

against nonparties without past illegal behavior is a content-based restriction. Thus,
McKwic misreads the reach of Madsen
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762. A state court injunction constitutes state action even
if both opposing parties are private actors. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Gresham Park Community
v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1238-39 (5th Cir. 1981); Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595
F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979).
2W Madsen, 512 U.S.
at 764.
20
312 U.S. at 499.
210 See id. at 499-500.
211 In Gottfried v. Medieal PlanningServices, Inc., 142 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 1998), the
Sixth Circuit, in a case substantially similar to the facts raised in Cheffer, found that
none of the Abstention Doctrines applied, but then noted, under the principles of
comity and federalism outlined in the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, that federal
courts should abstain from entering an injunction against a state court until the
state court has an opportunity to clarify the reach of the injunction to nonparties.
See id. at 332. Though the Pullman Abstention Doctrine applies in a case addressing
an ambiguous statute that the courts have not had the opportunity to address, Pullman generally should not apply when a court injunction is at issue because the court
has obviously had the opportunity to address the matter. Moreover, a nonparty
generally does not have the opportunity to request modification or clarification to a
state injunction. The court in Gottftied, however, pointed to an unpublished Ohio
case that ruled that an original action in prohibition could be used to challenge an
injunction that restricts the free speech of a nonparty. See id.
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In Wisconsin v. Constantineau,212 the Supreme Court clearly set-

tled the issue of how a federal court is to weigh the clarity of the state
law embroiled in a constitutional controversy before deciding
whether Pullmanapplies. In Constantineau,a law enforcement officer
posted a notice to all liquor stores forbidding the sale of alcohol to
the federal plaintiff for one year. 213 The federal plaintiff was not provided notice or the opportunity for a hearing.2 4 Though urged to
apply Pullman and avoid the constitutional question, the Court instead found the practice of posting notices unconstitutional. Since
216
the statute was clear and unambiguous, Pullman did not apply
Pullmanabstention is only appropriate when state law is unclear. "
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Hawaii
HousingAuthority v. Midkiff21 8 The state argued that the Court should
apply Pullman and avoid reaching the constitutional issues because
the controversy involved state law.19 In rejecting this argument, the
Court found Pullman inapplicable because the state statute was clear
and unambiguous2" Pullman is appropriate when the state law is
unclear,nl Pullman is not appropriate where the state statute cannot
be interpreted in such a way as to avoid reaching the constitutional
question.'m Abstention is the exception and not the rule; thus, the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine is limited to unclear issues of state
law.
In the Cheffer case, the issues of state law are not, and cannot be,
unclear. According to Pullman, the ostensible basis for federal court
abstention in reaching the merits of the constitutional claim was to
212 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
213 See id. at 435.
214Seid

21 See id. at 437. The Court found that the facts of the case demanded
an oppor-

tunity for due process and that the statute lacked any provision for the victim of the
posting to be heard. See id. at 437-39.
P16 Se id. at 439.
217 See id. at 438 (citing Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965)).
218 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Hawaii Housing Authority involved a factually complicated constitutional challenge to the Hawaii Land Reform Act, which was designed
to redistribute the landownership of Hawaiians more evenly because the vast majority 219
of land in Hawaii was owned by avery
few people. See id. at 231-35.
46.a.sae..s
See Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S. at 236. The state also advanced
a
Younger abstention argument. See id.
no See id. at 236-37.
22 Seeid.
n See id. at 236. The Court, by inference, said that,
if the state statute is "fairly
subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary" the constitutional issue,
then Pullman abstention is appropriate. Id. (quoting Harman, 380 U.S at 534).
22 Se HawaiiHousingAuthority, 467 U.S. at 236.
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allow the Texas Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve the uncertain area of law. In Cheffer, the state court crafted the injunction.
Pullmanabstention is therefore inappropriate. 4
B. Application of Younger
1. The Pending Prosecution
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
found that the Younger Abstention Doctrine2" did not block Cheffer's
suit, stating: "The Supreme Court has directed that Federal Courts
should not intervene in on-going state proceedings 'when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.'" m "Younger abstention is only
appropriate, however, when the federal constitutional claims at issue
can be raised by the federal plaintiff in an on-going state court proceeding."m
Noting that Cheffer had no remedy in state court
"except to subject herself to a criminal contempt citation," the court
reasoned that Younger abstention was inappropriate and that the district court had jurisdiction to hear Cheffer's claim." 8 The Eleventh
Circuit was aware that similar issues presented in the federal court
were pending in a contemporaneous state court proceeding before
the Florida Supreme Court.2
The Eleventh Circuit, however, did
not apply the Younger Abstention Doctrine, nor did it require that
Cheffer intervene in the state court action to have her constitutional
claim adjudicated.
In order to ascertain correctly whether the principles of Younger
apply, the litigant must first recognize the crucial distinguishing factor involving a pending state proceeding against the federal plaintiff.
The federal party in Younger"was indicted in a California state court,"
2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Cheffer, did
not address the PuilmanAbstention Doctrine.
=2 SeeYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
22
Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Younger, 401

U.S. at 43-44).
Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 709; see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian
Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628-29 (1986) (holding that Younger applies as long as in
the course of the state proceedings the federal plaintiff would have a full and fair
opgortunity to litigate the constitutional claim).
Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 709.
The same amended permanent injunction was being challenged in both state
and federal court. The named defendants challenged the constitutionality of the
injunction in state court, while Cheffer, who was not a party to the state court proceeding, challenged application of the injunction to nonparties through the "in
concert" provision.
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prior to filing a complaint requesting a federal court to enjoin the

pending state prosecution against him.2S
Younger articulates the
"national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending
state court proceedings except under special circumstances."2' 1 The
Younger Court, however, limited its holding by stating: "We express
no view about the circumstances under which federal courts may act
when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the
federal proceeding is begun."5 2
The Younger Abstention Doctrine's foundation rests on a sensitivity toward the principles of equity, comity, and federalism.2
Younger reflects a respect for state functions, a continuation of the
federalist principle that the Federal Government will function best if
the states and their institutions are free to execute their separate
functions, and an acknowledgment that the nation is comprised of a
union of individual state governments. M Younger addressed these issues by refusing to allow a federal plaintiff, who was a defendant in a
pending state criminal prosecution, to obtain a federal court ruling
in the midst of the pending state action. 253 The concurring opinion

ofJustice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan, further explained the parameters of the Younger holding. Noting several cases to which the
Younger decision would apply, Justice Stewart declared: "In all of
these cases, the Court deals only with the proper policy to be followed by a federal court when asked to intervene by injunction or
declaratory judgment in a criminal prosecution which is contemporaneously pending in a state court."'

As noted by the Court, "a proceed-

ing was already pending in the state court, affording Harris an opportunity to raise his constitutional claims."5 7 Hence, the existence
of the pending state prosecution was central to the Younger decision.
Furthermore, Younger abstention cases discussing the requirement of a pending state proceeding are manifold. In the Younger
companion case, Samuels v. Mackellm the Court abstained because
the federal plaintiffs were parties to a proceeding in state court and
had an opportunity there to raise their constitutional claims. As
2"
2
2

Younger, 401 U.S. at 38-39.
Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
Id.

See id. at 43-44.
See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975) (discussing Younger).
M See Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
Id. at 55 (StewartJ, concurring) (emphasis added).
2 Id. at 49.
401 U.S. 66, 66 (1971).
2'
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noted by the Samuels Court, the federal plaintiffs "in these two cases
were all indicted in a New York State Court on charges of criminal
anarchy."" 9 As in Younger, the Samuels Court expressed "no views on
the propriety of declaratory relief when no state proceeding is pending at the time the federal suit is begun. " 240 In both Younger and
Samuels, abstention was proper because the federal plaintiffs were
also parties to state court proceedings that were pending at the time
the federal suit was initiated.
For the same reason that Younger applies to the facts in Juidice v.
Vail,24' Younger was found not to apply to the facts of Cheffer.'
In
Juidice,Vail, a state court party, had been found in contempt of court
as ajudgment debtor.""' While still a party in the state court, Vail attempted to bring a federal action to enjoin enforcement of the statutory provisions authorizing the contempt judgment.2" Again, as in
Younger and Samuels, the federal plaintiff was a party to a state court
proceeding that allowed an adequate opportunity to present a constitutional claim for relief.245
The federal plaintiffs in the previously discussed cases were also
party defendants in a pending state proceeding; this is precisely why
the Younger Abstention Doctrine is inapplicable to Cheffer. Unlike
the plaintiff in Younger, the federal plaintiff in Cheffer was not a party
to any pending proceeding in state court and had never been arrested under the state court injunction.
The federal plaintiff in Steffel v. Thompson!" is almost identical to
the federal plaintiff in Cheffer. like the litigant in Cheffer, the federal
plaintiff in Steffel was not involved in any pending state court prosecuuon."' Rather, a companion of Steffel was involved in a pending
240
state prosecution.
In contrast to the Younger litigants, Steffel had
been personally threatened with arrest under a Georgia criminal
trespass statute.2 9 Though Steffel "desired to return to the shopping
center to distribute handbills, he [did not do] so because of his con-

Id. at 67.

29

Id. ai 73-74.

240
241

430 U.S. 327 (1977).
v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1993).
Sa]udice,430 U.S. at 329.
Seeid. at 330.
See id. at 337.
415 U.S. 452 (1974).
See id. at 455-56.
See id. at 454-59.
See id. at 456-59.

SSeeCheffer
243

2"
245
246
247
24
249
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cern that he, too, would be arrested for violation" of the Georgia
statute.2W

Similarly, in Cheffer several pro-life protesters had been named
as defendants in a court ordered injunction bought by several abortion clinics. This injunction applied to the named defendants and
those acting "in concert" with them. Ms. Cheffer was not a named
defendant. She wanted, however, to distribute literature and discuss
alternatives to abortion on a public sidewalk outside the abortion
clinic within the thirty-six-foot buffer zone. The injunction prohibited the named defendants and those acting in concert with them
from using the public sidewalk.'5 The injunction required city officials to post a sign stating: "WARNING. Demonstrations and picketing in this area are limited by court order. Violators of this court order are subject to arrest." 252 The local police enforced the injunction
by arresting anyone espousing a pro-life message who dared enter
the thirty-six-foot speech-free zone. When these non-party arrestees
were brought before the state judge who issued the injunction, the
judge stated that his order applied to anyone with a pro-life view.
Ms. Cheffer became aware of how the "in concert" section of the injunction was being applied. Though not named in the injunction,
she feared prosecution under the injunction.2m Accordingly, Ms.
Cheffer is unlike the three federal intervenors in Younger who the
Court dismissed for lack of a genuine controversy.3 5
The Younger Court characterized the allegations of the threat of
prosecution by the other three plaintiff-intervenors as merely
In contrast, the Steffel Court held that
"imaginary or speculative."'
Mr. Steffel's allegations of the threat of prosecution could not be
characterized as either speculative or imaginary.2 17 Steffel went on to
state that the "prosecution of petitioner's handbilling companion is
"0oId. at 456.
251 The state court judge loosely applied the "in concert" provision to any person
entering the thirty-six foot buffer zone who espoused a pro-life view regardless of
whether she was actively aiding and abetting the named defendants. See Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 784-820 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 711 (11th Cir. 1993);
Staver, supra note 196, at 476.
2
Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d. 664, 680 (Fla.
1993).
See Madwren, 512 U.S. at 795, 813-20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissentinUn part).
See Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 708.
See id. at 708-09.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
S7 eeSteffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974).
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ample demonstration that petitioner's concern with arrest has not
been 'chimerical.'""
In like manner, Cheffer's claims were neither speculative nor
imaginary. Because other unnamed pro-life protesters not associated
with the named defendants had been prosecuted under the "in concert" provision of the injunction, Cheffer's fear of prosecution was
legitimate and real. Approximately fifty other non-party pro-life protesters were arrested for entering the so-called "buffer zone."" ConId. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)).
Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 707. State and federal courts may issue injunctions against
defendants and those acting "in concert" with the defendants. See FED. R. Civ. P.
65(d). Rule 65(d) was patterned after the Clayton Act, which was enacted to curtail
abuses of federal strike injunctions. See H.R. Rep. No. 612 (1912). Judge Learned
Hand once observed:
[A court] cannot lawfully enjoin the world at large no matter how
broadly it words its decree. If it assumes to do so, the decree is pro
tanto brutumfulmen [sound and fury signifying nothing], and the persons enjoined are free to ignore it. It is not vested with sovereign
powers to declare conduct unlawful; its jurisdiction is limited to those
over whom it gets personal service, and who therefore have their day
in court. Thus, the only occasion when a person not a party may be
punished is when he has helped to bring about, not merely what the
decree has forbidden, because it may have gone too far, but what it
has power to forbid, an act of a party. This means the respondent
must either abet the defendant, or must be legally identified with
him.... This is far from being a formal distinction; it goes deep into
the powers of a Court of Equity.... It is by ignoring such procedural
limitations that the injunction of a Court of Equity may by slow steps
be made to realize the worst fears of those who are jealous of its prerogative.
Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832,832-33 (2d Cir. 1930).
The United States Supreme court has also recognized certain limitations of an
injunction:
[Ilt is true that persons not technically agents or employees may be
specifically enjoined from knowingly aiding a defendant in performing an act if their relation is that of associate or confederate. Since
such persons are legally identified with the defendant and privy to his
contempt, the provision merely makes explicit as to them that which
the law already implies. But by extending the injunction to "all persons to whom notice of the injunction should come," the District
Court assumed to make punishable the conduct of persons who act
independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according to
law.... To subject them to such peril violates established principals
of equityjurisdiction and procedure.
Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431,436-37 (1934). The injunction at
issue in Cheffer sought, in essence, to enjoin the entire world. The state court judge
ordered that a sign be posted around the abortion clinic stating: "WARNING.
Demonstrations and picketing in this area are limited by court order. Violators of
this court order are subject to arrest." Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr.,
Inc., 626 So. 2d. 664, 680 (Fla. 1993). Unfortunately, some courts have not been
2
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sequently, unlike the three plaintiff-intervenors in Younger, Ms. Cheffer had an "acute, live controversy" with the state regarding her constitutionally protected rights.20
A cursory examination of Hicks v. Miranda!" might compel one
to assert that the Court's holding argues for application of the
Younger Abstention Doctrine to the facts of Cheffer. In Hicks, the Supreme Court noted that the "principles of Younger v. Harris should
apply in full force" when "state criminal proceedings are begun
against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but
before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place
careful when crafting and enforcing injunctions. Courts should be cautious when
applying injunctions to those acting "in concert. See, e.g., McKusick v. City of Melbourne, 96 F.3d 478, 484 & n.5 (l1th Cir. 1996) (stating that courts lack "equitable
power to issue an injunction that binds the world at large'); Swetland v. Curry, 188
F.2d 841, 843 (6th Cir. 1951) (explaining that a nonparty "may not be held guilty of
contempt for violating an injunction unless he is shown to be identified with or is
an aider or abettor of the party enjoined'); Kean v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 888, 890 (8th
Cir. 1950) ("[Plersons who are not parties to the injunction or in privity with
them... are not bound by the decree and cannot be held liable for acts done contrary thereto even though the decree assumes to bind them."); Regal Knitwear Co.
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13 (1945) (stating that a court "may not grant an enforceable
order or injunction so broad as to make punishable the conduct of persons who act
independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according to law"); Petersen v. Fee Int'l Ltd., 435 F. Supp. 938, 942 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (holding that Rule
65(d) follows the common-law rule that nonparties are bound by an injunction only
if they are legally identified with a named party or aided or abetted the named party
in his violation of the decree); Wright v. County Sch. Bd., 309 F. Supp. 671, 677
(E.D. Va. 1970) (determining that Rule 65(d) fixes the scope of valid injunctions,
and terms in a decree exceeding the rule are of no effect; nonparties who act independently are not subject to sanctions); Baltz v. The Fair, 178 F. Supp. 691, 693
(N.D. IM. 1959) ("Persons who are not parties to the injunction or in privity with
them.., are not bound by the decree insofar as it operates in person and cannot be
held for acts done contrary to its terms"); Chilsolm v. Caines, 147 F. Supp. 188, 191
(E.D.S.C. 1954) (explaining that an "injunction cannot issue to bind the public at
large" even though it purports to do so); Baltimore Transit Co. v. Flynn, 50 F. Supp.
382, 386 (D. Md. 1943) (noting that a court "cannot lawfully enjoin the world at
lar e).
See Younger, 401 U.S. at 41; Cheffe, 6 F.3d at 708-09.
422 U.S. 332 (1975). The Court said that the federal plaintiff 'had a substantial stake in the state proceedings...." Id. at 348. Such language might seem to
indicate that a federal plaintiff who is not a party in the state proceeding, but possesses a "substantial stake," could be barred from adjudicating her constitutional
claim in federal court under the Younger analysis. See id. Hicks does not stand, however, for the proposition that a federal plaintiff who has an interest in the outcome
of a pending state proceeding although not a party is barred from bringing an action in federal court. To the contrary, the facts in Hicks indicate that the federal
plaintiffs' employees had already become enmeshed in ongoing state proceedings.
See id. at 348-49. The Hicks federal plaintiff had already been a target of state investigation and was on the verge of being charged by the state. See id. at 349. The
mere fact that the Hicks federal plaintiff beat the state officials to the courthouse was
not enough to exempt him from the YoungerAbstention Doctrine. See id.
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in the federal court. ... "' Because of a violation of the obscenity
standards, the federal plaintiff in Hicks faced possible criminal
prosecution at the time the federal lawsuit was initiated. Although
the federal plaintiff's employees were charged, state criminal proceedings against the plaintiff had not been instituted and were not
begun until after the federal plaintiff filed a complaint in federal
court. That the Hicks federal plaintiff was a party to an ongoing state

proceeding, though the state criminal proceeding was not initiated
until after the federal suit was initiated, is a crucial fact that distin-

guishes Hicks from the facts surrounding Cheffer. Again, Cheffer was
not involved in any state proceedings, nor was prosecution against

her about to commence. Therefore, the Younger Abstention Doctrine is inapplicable to Cheffer.

Because Cheffer was not involved in any pending state proceeding, she had no opportunity to adjudicate her constitutional claims.
In the absence of federal court intervention, Ms. Cheffer would face
the difficult choice of either intentionally flouting state law,' or
N2

Id. at 349.

"3 There is a significant difference between an unconstitutional statute or ordinance and an injunction. According to the United States Supreme Court, one may
violate an unconstitutional statute or ordinance at will and later challenge its constitutionality. See Shutdesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). Any fine
or conviction levied for the violation will be null and void ab initio once the law is
ruled unconstitutional. If one is found in contempt of violating an injunction that
is later ruled unconstitutional, however, the contempt finding and punishment remain. See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). This is known as the collateral bar rule. Simply put, a party subject to a court order must obey it or face contempt. The court order must be respected until it is later vacated or declared
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Waker, 388 U.S. at 307 (sustaining contempt conviction
for violation of an ex parte injunction and upholding the lower court's application
of the collateral bar rule even where "the equities cut so dramatically in favor of the
accused contemnors"); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293
(1947) ("[A]n order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and
person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings"); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 190 (1922) ("It is for the court of first
instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is
reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or a higher court, its orders
based on its decisions are to be respected, and disobedience of them is contempt of
its lawful authority, to be punished"); In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir.
1991) ("Disobedience of an invalid court order may be punished as a criminal contempt"); In re Establishment Inspection of Hem Iron Works, 881 F.2d 722, 726 (9th
Cir. 1989); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1346 (1st Cir. 1986), modifled on reh'gen banc, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987). The collateral bar rule is premised on the ideas of preventing chaos and fostering respect for the rule of law. See
Walker, 388 U.S. at 320-21. The only exceptions to the collateral bar rule are lack of
subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Some courts have found another exception
"where the injunction was transparently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to
validity." In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d at 1347 (citing Walkf, 388 U.S. at
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foregoing her constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming entangled in a state proceeding. However, as noted in Steffe,
"it is not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest
or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute which he claims
deters the exercise of his constitutional rights."2" The Supreme
Court's opinion in Steffel is directly on point and controls the outcome of whether the Younger principle applies to the facts of Cheffer.
Clearly, abstention is not appropriate when a party lacks the opportunity to vindicate her constitutional claims in a court proceeding.
To apply Younger to such a scenario offends the core of "Our Federalism." As reaffirmed in Steffe
In the instant case, principles of federalism not only do not preclude federal intervention, they compel it. Requiring the federal
courts totally to step aside when no state criminal prosecution is
pending against a federal plaintiff would turn federalism on its
head. When federal claims are premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)-as they are here-we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies, recognizing
the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts
to protect constitutional rights. But exhaustion of state remedies
is precisely what would be required if both federal injunctive and
declaratory relief were unavailable in a case where no state prosecution had been commenced.2
Without the ability to pursue her claim in federal court, Cheffer
found herself "placed 'between the Scylla of intentionally flouting
state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what [s]he believes to be
constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding.'" 2"
When confronted with such a situation, the Supreme Court in
Wooley v. Maynard said, "Younger does not bar federal jurisdiction."2'
In Wooley, the defendant was arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and
sentenced for violating a state law that required the display of a particular license plate on all automobiles registered within the state.
After serving his sentence, Maynard filed a complaint in federal
court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the state statute on the basis
that the statute was a violation of his First Amendment rights. In addressing the principles of equitable restraint enunciated in Younger,
315); see also In re Establishment Inspection of Hem Iron Works, 881 F.2d at 727.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974).
Id. at 472-73 (internal quotes omitted).
" Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710 (1977) (quoting Steff4e 415 U.S. at
462).
.1. 430 U.S. at 711.
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the Supreme Court noted that the federal plaintiff was not attempting to annul the results of a state trial, but was trying to obtain prospective relief to preclude future prosecution under the statute.
Under those circumstances, the plaintiff could not "be denied consideration of a federal remedy."' likewise, Cheffer was not seeking
to annul a state trial; rather, she was seeking prospective relief.
Some have argued that federal courts should abstain even when
there is no pending state court proceeding if the federal plaintiff has
not first attempted to intervene in the state courts or has not
brought a separate action in the state system. This argument was
raised and rejected outright in Hoover v. Wagner.2" The facts in Hoover are very similar to the facts in Cheffer. The Hoover case also involved a state court injunction issued against certain named pro-life
protesters and those acting "in concert" with them!" like Cheffer,
the injunction in Hoover created a buffer zone around abortion clinics. State officials, including the state courts, enforced the injunction against anyone espousing a pro-life view entering the buffer
zone who spoke with or even glanced toward a nearby defendant
who was named in the state court injunction.2 Fearing arrest, the
federal plaintiffs, who were not named in the state court injunction
and were not involved in any state court proceeding, brought suit in
federal court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.2
Id.
M 47 F.Sd 845, 847 (7th Cir. 1995). The facts in Hoover involved two pro-life
picketers and ajournalist who brought suit in federal court challenging a state court
injunction that restricted certain named defendants and those acting in concert
with them from picketing certain named abortion clinics. See id. at 846. The federal plaintiffs were not parties to the state court injunction and had never been
named in any state court proceeding, but they claimed they were in fear of arrest for
picketing in and around the abortion clinics and for taking photographs of the incidents. See id. The state court injunction prohibited certain named defendants
"and all persons acting in concert with them and having received notice of" the injunction from trespassing on or blocking access to specified abortion clinics; from
congregating, demonstrating, or otherwise protesting with twenty-five feet of the
entrances to the clinics; from photographing license plates or cars of those using
the clinics; and from refusing to desist from "sidewalk counseling" at the request of
the person being counseled. See id. The plaintiffs further claimed that law enforcement officers and the state court judges had applied the injunction to anyone
standing in the vicinity of a named defendant without any additional proof of active
or knowing association with the named defendants. See id. at 846-47. Moreover, the
journalist alleged he had been threatened with arrest for taking photographs. See
id. at 847.
VO See id. at 846-47.
271 See id. at 847.
See id. at 846-47. Because the federal plaintiffs were not named in the state
court injunction and had not yet been arrested for violating its terms under the "in
2U
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Chief Judge Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit opined that
[t]he core of the Younger doctrine is the proposition that a person who is being prosecuted by a state for violating its laws is not
allowed to derail the prosecution by bringing a suit in federal
court to enjoin the prosecution on the ground that the state statute on which it is based is unconstitutional."s
The YoungerAbstention Doctrine only applies to pending state court
proceedings or "litigation between the same parties... raising the same
issues." 4 In Hoover, the federal defendants argued that the federal
court should abstain from hearing the case because the plaintiffs
could either file the same complaint in state court or intervene in
one of several state court proceedings!" "There is no duty to inter5
vene to stave off the use of a case as res judicata against one[self]."2
"Certainly nothing in Younger or the cases following it suggests that
persons claiming a violation of their federal rights have an obligation
before turning to federal court to see whether there is some state
court proceeding that they might join in order to present their fed-

concert" provision, the federal court defendants argued the case should be dismissed for lack of standing. See id. at 847. The Seventh Circuit nevertheless found
that plaintiffs did have standing.
All that a plaintiff need show to establish standing to sue is a reasonable probability-not a certainty-of suffering tangible harm unless
he obtains the relief that he is seeking in the suit... Arrest, prosecution, and conviction are tangible harms, and so is abandoning one's
constitutional right of free speech in order to avert those harms.
Therefore the question on which standing turns in this case is the
probability that unless the plaintiffs obtain a declaration or injunction
limiting the enforcement of the Wisconsin state court's injunction,
they will either forgo their right of free speech or be arrested, prosecuted, and perhaps even convicted. We cannot reckon the probability
of these consequences as being low. The two abortion protesters in
the trio of plaintiffs have made clear that they want to go right up to
the line that separates legal from illegal protest. If that line is drawn

in vague and wavering fashion by the state court injunction, or if the
Milwaukee police and other law enforcement officers interpret the injunction in a way that subjects to arrest people who stop just short of
the line, then either these plaintiffs will be arrested if they insist on

going right up to the line, or they will draw well back from the line

and as a result (since it is quite possible that the injunction goes as far

as it could without violating the First Amendment) forgo the full exercise of their constitutional rights.
Id. (citations omitted).
2s Id. at 848.
"4
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 440 (1977) (emphasis added).
. See Hoor,, 47 F.3d at 848.
R;
i6 see also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
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eral claims there."z" Younger does not impose a duty on the federal
plaintiff to intervene in other suits pending in state court to which
the federal plaintiff is not a party.
Requiring a federal plaintiff to discover, and then join, any factually similar pending state action would create timeliness constraints. In addition, if similarly situated plaintiffs could be forced to
join an ongoing state proceeding, they would be constrained by the
allegations and pleadings of the pending state proceeding. Plaintiffs
such as Cheffer and Hoover would be unfairly limited by the claims
and defenses raised by the original state parties. Such a heavy burden would result in the denial of constitutionally protected freedoms
and the inability to seek adequate redress. Requiring potential federal plaintiffs to seek out and join any factually similar state proceeding would certainly result in the denial of constitutionally protected
rights. In Steffel, the United States Supreme Court was informed during oral argument that the identical issue was pending in the state
courts! 8 The Steffel Court thus highlighted Roe v. Wade,28 noting that
while the pending prosecution of a physician under Texas law was
found to render his action for declaratory and injunctive relief impermissible, this did not prevent the Supreme Court from granting
Roe, against whom no action was pending, a declaratory judgment
that the statute was unconstitutional.2 ' Steffel did not require the
federal plaintiff to seek out and join the ongoing state proceeding.
An action may be brought in federal court so long as the plaintiff is
not a party to ongoing state proceedings.
2.

Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

The Supreme Court in Steffel noted the difference between injunctive and declaratory relief by observing that the lower court
erred in treating the requests for injunctive and declaratory relief as
a single issue."'
"When no state prosecution is pending and the only question is
whether declaratory relief is appropriate [J ... the congressional
scheme that makes the federal courts the primary guardian of
constitutional rights, and the expressed congressional authorization of declaratory relief, afforded because it is a less harsh and

M See Hoofe, 47 F.3d at 848.
SeeSteffelv. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 n.19 (1974).
2" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"0 See Steff4e 415 U.S. at 471 n.19; Roe, 410 U.S. at 125-27, 166-67.
"I See Steffe4 415 U.S. at 463.
278

1150

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28:1102

abrasive remedy than the injunction, become the factors of primary significance. " '

In analyzing the standard for declaratory relief, the Court noted
that a pervasive sense of nationalism led to the enactment of certain
civil rights laws and further found that the new exertion of federal
power was no longer entrusted to the enforcement of state agencies.2" In order to create a system that would permit federal courts
to be the ultimate arbiters of federal constitutional rights against
governmental intrusion, Congress, in 1934, enacted the Declaratory
Judgment Act.2 The Steffel Court observed:
That Congress plainly intended declaratory relief to act as an alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction and to be utilized to test the constitutionality of state criminal statutes in cases
where injunctive relief would be unavailable is amply evidenced
by the legislative history of the AcLt.
Clearly, the Declaratory Judgment Act "was intended to provide
an alternative to injunctions against state officials."2 The Supreme
Court held that "'a federal district court has the duty to decide the
appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusions as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction.'" 2" Additionally, the Steffel Court pointed out that "when
no state proceeding is pending and thus considerations of equity,
comity, and federalism have little vitality, the propriety of granting
federal declaratory relief may properly be considered independently
of a request for injunctive relief."2 Indeed, "'different considerations
enter into a federal court's decision as to declaratory relief, on the
one hand, and injunctive relief, on the other.'" 2"
The "persuasive force of the court's opinion and judgment may
lead state prosecutors, courts, and legislators to reconsider their reEven though a despective responsibilities toward the statute."'
claratory judgment has the full force and effect of a final judgment,
"it is a milder form of relief than an injunction. Though it may be
persuasive, it is not alternately coercive; noncompliance with it may
Id. (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 104 (1971) (separate opinion of
BrennanJ.)).
Se id. at 464 n.13.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2212 (1988); see also Steffe, 415 U.S. at 466.
Steffel, 415 U.S. at 466.
2
Id. at 467.
Id. at 468 (quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967)).
2
Id. at 462.
2W Id. at 469 (quoting Zwickler, 389 U.S. at 252-55).
2W Id. at 470.
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be inappropriate but it is not contempt.""' Requiring federal courts
to step aside in situations where the plaintiff is not a party to any
state civil or criminal prosecution "would turn federalism on its
head."' Therefore, according to Steffe,
regardless of whether injunctive relief may be appropriate, federal declaratory relief is not precluded when no state prosecution
is pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a genuine threat
of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute, whether an
attack is made on the constitutionality of the statute on its face or
as applied."'
C. Application ofRooker-Feldman
The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine does not apply to the
facts of Cheffer because the federal plaintiff did not attempt to use
the federal forum as an appellate court over the state forum. Cheffer was not a party to the ongoing state action and therefore did not
have the opportunity to appeal the state court decision. "The RookerFeldman Abstention Doctrine does not apply to bar suit in federal
court brought by ajarty that was not a party in the preceding action
in the state court." Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for
SSee Steffe 415 U.S. at 471. Some might argue that a federal court should
never enjoin enforcement of a state court injunction because a federal injunction
against a state injunction might create a scenario where state police, prosecutors, or
judges could be held in contempt for enforcing the state court order. Constitutional rights must not be abandoned, however, simply because the enforcement officials might be punished for enforcing an unconstitutional injunction. Moreover,
as noted in Steffe, declaratory relief is an alternative remedy that must be separately
considered from the request for injunctive relief. See id. Declaratory relief is a
much milder remedy than injunctive relief. Whereas noncompliance with an injunction may result in contempt, noncompliance with a declaratory judgment does
not result in contempt. At a minimum, a federal plaintiff should be afforded declaratory relief in the right circumstances.
"

Id. at 472.

"i Id. at 475. All too often, federal courts treat injunctive and declaratory relief

as a single issue. When a federal plaintiff fails to meet the criteria for injunctive relief, courts frequently deny both injunctive and declaratory relief in the same sentence without separate analysis. There are many cases where a federal plaintiff
might not meet the threshold for injunctive relief but should still be awarded declaratory relief. To obtain a preliminary injunction a plaintiff generally must prove
(1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm, (3) the harm to the
plaintiff greatly outweighs the harm to the defendant and granting the relief is in
the public interest, and (4) no adequate remedy at law. Declaratory relief requires
none of the four criteria for injunctive relief. Violation of an injunction may result
in contempt but not so with declaratory relief. While an injunction must be complied with, declaratory relief is advisory. The difference between an injunction and
declaratory relief is like the difference between a command and hortatory advice.
2" United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Valenti v.
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the Third Circuit, in Valenti v. Mitchell, noted that it could find "no
authority which would extend the Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine to persons not parties to the proceedings before the State Supreme Court."25
D. Application ofBrillhart
The BrillhartAbstention Doctrine applies only to circumstances
involving a federal suit addressing state issues under the Declaratory
Judgment Act with parties who are also parties to a pending parallel
state proceeding.2" Brillhart clearly does not apply to the facts of
Cheffer. First, consistent with the theme underlying the various aspects of abstention, Cheffer was not a party to a pending state court
proceeding. Second, Cheffer dealt with federal constitutional questions rather than state law. Third, Cheffer was not parallel to the state
proceeding because it dealt with the application of the injunction to
nonparties through the "in concert" provision while the state case
dealt with the application of the injunction to parties based on past
history.2 Finally, while the federal plaintiff in Cheffer requested declaratory relief, she also requested injunctive relief.
E. Application ofColorado River
The Colorado River Abstention Doctrine applies only when substantially the same parties are litigating substantially the same issues
in state court. ColoradoRiver does not apply to the facts of Chefferfor
two reasons. First, Cheffer was not a party to the state court action.
There was no obligation that Cheffer attempt to intervene in the ongoing state proceeding in order to vindicate her rights. Second, the
issues between the state and federal court, while similar, were not
substantially similar. The state court parties litigated the underlying
issue of the constitutionality of the injunction. That issue obviously
involved questions of law and fact. The questions of fact revolved
around whether there was sufficient evidence to support the imposition of an injunction, and the questions of law revolved around
whether the injunction exceeds constitutional protections. Moreover, the litigation in the state court proceeding involved the parties
and their past actions. The litigation in the federal court, on the

Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 1992).
"5 Va/enti, 962 F.2d at 297-98.
See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 491 (1942); see also Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282-83 (1995).
See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994).
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other hand, involved only the application of the "in concert" provision that the state parties would not have standing to raise.'
Because Cheffer is not a party to the ongoing state action, and
since her concern was focused on the application of the "in concert"
provision to non-parties, the concerns raised in her complaint were
not substantially similar to those litigated by the parties to the state
court action. Therefore, the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine is
inapplicable.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Abstention Doctrines have many facets, but their main
purpose is to preserve the balance between state and federal sovereignty. The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits a federal court from issuing an injunction against a state proceeding except as expressly
authorized by Congress, where necessary to aid its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgment. Civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are specifically excepted from the AntiInjunction Act. Consequently, any action alleging a violation of First
Amendment rights is not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.
The PullmanAbstention Doctrine does not apply when the state
law is clear and unambiguous. Moreover, Pullman does not apply
when the state courts have interpreted the state law, and it may not
apply where the state courts have had the opportunity to interpret
the state law but have failed or refused to do so. Pullman is only applicable when the federal court is faced with an ambiguous state law
susceptible to multiple meanings, one that may prove the statute
constitutional and the other that may render it unconstitutional.
Pullmanshould never apply to a state-ordered injunction because, by
its very nature, the state court created the challenged law.
The Younger Abstention Doctrine does not apply when there is
no pending state proceeding against the federal plaintiff at the time
the federal complaint is filed. The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine applies only to those circumstances where the federal plaintiff
attempts to use the federal forum as an appellate court over a state
court action. In other words, if a federal plaintiff begins an action in
state court, receives a decision from the state court, and instead of
appealing through the state court system, ceases the state action and
presents the identical claim in federal court, the Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine applies. Rooker-Feldman is only concerned with the
See, e.g., id. at 776. Named parties do not have standing to challenge an "in
concert" provision; naturally, that provision applies to nonparties.
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federal plaintiff who begins in the state court system and fails to exhaust the state court appellate process. The Brillhart Abstention
Doctrine applies only to circumstances involving a federal suit addressing state issues under the DeclaratoryJudgment Act with parties
who are also parties to a pending parallel state proceeding. The
Colorado River Abstention Doctrine is not applicable when substantially the same parties are not litigating substantially the same issue
in a state forum. Finally, Colorado River is inapplicable if the state
proceedings have terminated or if the federal plaintiff was not a
party to the state court action.
One common thread underlying all of the doctrines of abstention is that abstention does not apply to a federal plaintiff who has
never been a party to a state court action. Moreover, abstention does
not apply to a federal plaintiff when there is no pending proceeding
in state court against the federal plaintiff on the same issue as long
as the federal plaintiff is not attempting to use the federal forum as
an appellate court over an unsuccessful partial journey through the
state court system. A plaintiff has the right to choose either the state
or federal forum to raise constitutional claims. The Abstention Doctrine cannot be used to force a federal plaintiff first to seek redress
in a state court by either filing a complaint there, intervening in another state court action, or filing an amicus brief in a pending state
court proceeding. Despite that a similar federal question is pending
in a state court action, the federal plaintiff may still seek redress in a
federal forum as long as the federal plaintiff is not a party to the ongoing state action.
The Abstention Doctrines are meant to maintain a balance between state and federal government. When understood properly,
the Abstention Doctrine should not preclude a plaintiff from utilizing the federal forum to redress constitutional violations when the
federal plaintiff is not a party to a pending state court action.

